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It is commonly observed that individuals often behave in a less self-interested way than is predicted by the standard homo economicus analysis. In public good contribution games, in ultimatum games, in charitable donations, and in many other similar settings, individuals typically behave in a much more public-spirited manner than economists predict (Frank, Gilovich and Regan 1993).Various explanations for this behavior have been suggested. Although these theories differ substantially in their details, a common theme in many of them is the underlying assumption that an individual chooses how to behave based in part on his or her perceptions of how others will behave and how others will judge his or her actions. The notion of a social norm is particularly relevant here. Although difficult to define precisely, a social norm can be distinguished by the feature that it is process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of individual rationality (Elster 1989). A social norm therefore represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that therefore is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval. Consequently, if others behave according to some socially accepted mode of behavior, then the individual will also behave appropriately; if others do not so behave, then the individual will respond in kind.

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Abstract:To date, much of the policy and research debate on contingent valuation mode effects has relied on experiences drawn from other research disciplines. This study provides the first contingent valuation phone-mail comparison that meets current standards for response rates, draws from a general population, is relevant to the valuation of general environmental goods, and allows comparisons with actual sign-ups. Consistent with previous research in other disciplines, social desirability bias is found in responses to subjective questions --thus leading to more environmentally favorable responses on the phone. However, this effect does not carry over to hypothetical participation decisions. Hypothetical bias is found in both modes. Yet, application of calibration methods using debriefing questions provided nearly identical values across modes. As such, neither mode appears to dominate from the perspective of providing more valid estimates of actual participation decisions. The selection of survey mode must be based on other criteria.

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