Ruminating about a provocation increases the likelihood of displaced aggression following a minor annoyance (trigger). In Study 1, provoked participants who ruminated for 25 min were more aggressive toward a fumbling confederate than were distracted participants. Provocation-induced negative affect was positively related to aggression but only among those who ruminated. Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1 and also found that the more negatively people reacted to the trigger, the more likely the trigger was to increase displaced aggression. Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 by using an 8-hr rumination period. All 3 studies suggest that ruminating about a provocation increases the likelihood that a minor triggering annoyance will increase displaced aggression.

Content analysis of 122 social psychology textbooks confirmed that displaced aggression received a surge of attention immediately following J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears (1939), but subsequent interest sharply declined. Contemporary texts give it little attention. By contrast, meta-analysis of the experimental literature confirms that it is a robust effect (mean effect size = +0.54). Additionally, moderator analyses showed that: (a) The more negative the setting in which the participant and target interacted, the greater the magnitude of displaced aggression; (b) in accord with N. E. Miller's (1948) stimulus generalization principle, the more similar the provocateur and target, the more displaced aggression; and (c) consistent with the contrast effect (L. Berkowitz & D. A. Knurek, 1969), the intensity of initial provocation is inversely related to the magnitude of displaced aggression.

Interpersonal provocation is a common and robust antecedent to aggression. Four studies identified angry rumination and reduced self-control as mechanisms underlying the provocation-aggression relationship. Following provocation, participants demonstrated decreased self-control on an unpleasant task relative to a control condition (Study 1). When provoked, rumination reduced self-control and increased aggression. This effect was mediated by reduced self-control capacity (Study 2). State rumination following provocation, but not anger per se, mediated the effect of trait rumination on aggression (Study 3). Bolstering self-regulatory resources by consuming a glucose beverage improved performance on a measure of inhibitory control following rumination (Study 4). These findings suggest that rumination following an anger-inducing provocation reduces self-control and increases aggression. Bolstering self-regulatory resources may reduce this adverse effect.

Previous measures of aggressive personality have focused on direct aggression (i.e., retaliation toward the provoking agent). An original self-report measure of trait displaced aggression is presented. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses provided support for a 3-factor conceptualization of the construct. These analyses identified an affective dimension (angry rumination), a cognitive dimension (revenge planning), and a behavioral dimension (general tendency to engage in displaced aggression). The trait measure demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability as well as convergent and discriminant construct validity. Unlike other related personality measures, trait displaced aggression significantly predicted indirect indicators of real-world displaced aggression (i.e., self-reported domestic abuse and road rage) as well as laboratory displaced aggression in 2 experiments.

A tit-for-tat matching rule (Axelrod, 1984) describes much interpersonal behavior. Yet, in daily life a retaliatory aggressive response to a trivially mild provocation often inappropriately exceeds that expected from the matching rule. The concept of triggered displaced aggression can explain these exceptions to the matching principle. Building from the Cognitive Neoassociationistic model of aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1989, 1990, 1993), we developed a theoretical framework of social and personality factors that moderate and mediate the disjunctively escalated retaliation that can result from triggered displaced aggression. Major explanatory factors in our analysis of such effects are as follows: (a) aspects of the Time 1 provocation and the immediate situation in which it occurred; (b) characteristics of initial provocations and personality factors of the actor that produce the ruminative thought that will temporally extend the effects of a Time 1 provocation, allowing them to interact with a delayed Time 2 minor triggering event; and (c) actions and attributes of the target of displaced aggression that augment these effects.

Very little is known about the neural circuitry guiding anger, angry rumination, and aggressive personality. In the present fMRI experiment, participants were insulted and induced to ruminate. Activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex was positively related to self-reported feelings of anger and individual differences in general aggression. Activity in the medial prefrontal cortex was related to self-reported rumination and individual differences in displaced aggression. Increased activation in the hippocampus, insula, and cingulate cortex following the provocation predicted subsequent self-reported rumination. These findings increase our understanding of the neural processes associated with the risk for aggressive behavior by specifying neural regions that mediate the subjective experience of anger and angry rumination as well as the neural pathways linked to different types of aggressive behavior.

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Although rumination following a provocation can increase aggression, no research has examined the processes responsible for this phenomenon. With predictions derived from the General Aggression Model, three experiments explored the impact of two types of post-provocation rumination on the processes whereby rumination augments aggression. In Experiment 1, relative to distraction, self-focused rumination uniquely increased the accessibility of arousal cognition, whereas provocation-focused rumination uniquely amplified the accessibility of aggressive action cognition. In Experiment 2, provocation-focused rumination uniquely increased systolic blood pressure. In Experiment 3, both types of rumination increased aggressive behaviour relative to a distraction condition. Angry affect partially mediated the effects of both provocation- and self-focused rumination on aggression. Self-critical negative affect partially mediated the effect of self-focused rumination but not provocation-focused rumination. These findings suggest that provocation-focused rumination influences angry affect, aggressive action cognition, and cardiovascular arousal, whereas self-focused rumination increases self-critical negative affect, angry affect, and arousal cognition. These studies enhance our understanding of why two types of post-provocation rumination increase aggressive behaviour.