Summary
Distributed energy management of interconnected microgrids that is based on model predictive control (MPC) relies on the cooperation of all agents (microgrids). This paper discusses the case in which some of the agents might perform one type of adversarial actions (attacks) and they do not comply with the decisions computed by performing a distributed MPC algorithm. In this regard, these agents could obtain a better performance at the cost of degrading the performance of the network as a whole. A resilient distributed method that can deal with such issues is proposed in this paper. The method consists of two parts. The first part is to ensure that the decisions obtained from the algorithm are robustly feasible against most of the attacks with high confidence. In this part, we formulate the economic dispatch problem, taking into account the attacks as a chance‐constrained problem, and employ a two‐step randomization‐based approach to obtain a feasible solution with a predefined level of confidence. The second part consists in the identification and mitigation of the adversarial agents, which utilizes hypothesis testing with Bayesian inference and requires each agent to solve a mixed‐integer problem to decide the connections with its neighbors. In addition, an analysis of the decisions computed using the stochastic approach and the outcome of the identification and mitigation method is provided. The performance of the proposed approach is also shown through numerical simulations.
In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is responsible to enforce the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient, strategicallystable, and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.
We consider the economic dispatch problem for a day-ahead, peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity market of prosumers (i.e., energy consumers who can also produce electricity) in a distribution network. In our model, each prosumer has the capability of producing power through its dispatchable or nondispatchable generation units and/or has a storage energy unit. Furthermore, we consider a hybrid main grid & P2P market in which each prosumer can trade power both with the main grid and with (some of) the other prosumers. First, we cast the economic dispatch problem as a noncooperative game with coupling constraints. Then, we design a fully-scalable algorithm to steer the system to a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). Finally, we show through numerical studies that the proposed methodology has the potential to ensure safe and efficient operation of the power grid.
In this paper, distributed energy management of interconnected microgrids, which is stated as a dynamic economic dispatch problem, is studied. Since the distributed approach requires cooperation of all local controllers, when some of them do not comply with the distributed algorithm that is applied to the system, the performance of the system might be compromised. Specifically, it is considered that adversarial agents (microgrids with their controllers) might implement control inputs that are different than the ones obtained from the distributed algorithm. By performing such behavior, these agents might have better performance at the expense of deteriorating the performance of the regular agents. This paper proposes a methodology to deal with this type of adversarial agents such that we can still guarantee that the regular agents can still obtain feasible, though suboptimal, control inputs in the presence of adversarial behaviors. The methodology consists of two steps: (i) the robustification of the underlying optimization problem and (ii) the identification of adversarial agents, which uses hypothesis testing with Bayesian inference and requires to solve a local mixed-integer optimization problem. Furthermore, the proposed methodology also prevents the regular agents to be affected by the adversaries once the adversarial agents are identified. In addition, we also provide a sub-optimality certificate of the proposed methodology.
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