Firms across the globe are affected by red tape, but there is little academic research on how country‐level institutions shape red tape perceptions. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that a variety of formal and informal country‐level institutions affect perceptions of red tape in the private sector. We test our hypotheses using six data sources, including the World Economic Forum and the World Bank. Our results indicate that red tape is weakly associated with a country's level of formalization and rule enforcement effectiveness and more prevalent in federal as opposed to unitary states. As for informal institutions, we find that red tape perceptions are more pronounced in countries with an increased conservative political ideology, higher levels of corruption, and cultures that emphasize individualism and uncertainty avoidance. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for theory and practice.
This study examines the attributes of organizational rules that influence rule following. Rule following fosters organizational effectiveness by aligning individual behaviours with organizational preference. While a range of theoretical explanations have been offered for rule following, the characteristics of rule design and implementation have received less empirical attention. Borrowing from the green tape theory of effective rules, this study examines the influence of two particular characteristics—rule formalization and rule consistency—on rule following. Three studies, which include two vignette experiments and a survey of two local government organizations, provide the data for the research. The results suggest that rule formalization and rule consistency independently increase rule following, with mixed evidence of interaction effects. The broad implication is that public managers must attend to both rule design and implementation to foster organizational rule following.
The underlying reasoning of much red tape research is that the level of rule burden, in terms of resources expended at implementing and complying with specific rules, is the main driver of red tape perceptions. In this study we challenge this claim and argue that stakeholder red tape perceptions are also affected by the favourability of the outcome. More specifically, if a certain rule or procedure has a positive outcome for a certain stakeholder, then this stakeholder will perceive lower levels of red tape, irrespective of rule burden. Using a survey experiment (n = 81), we show how variations in red tape perceptions are affected in equal measure by rule burden and outcome. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for red tape scholars, in particular the need to further understand the relationships between red tape perceptions and rule procedures and outcomes.
In this study, we aim to replicate and extend the negative effect of red tape on procedural satisfaction by conducting an experiment via the online crowdsourcing service MTurk. Our findings indicate that a higher level of red tape is indeed associated with lower procedural satisfaction. We also find support for a statistically significant interaction between red tape and political ideology; the negative effect of red tape on procedural satisfaction is stronger for individuals with more conservative political views. These findings confirm the pathological nature of red tape and affirm the relevance of experimental red tape research.
We focus on the relationships among administrative delay, red tape, and red tape-related organizational performance. We hypothesize that administrative delay leads to more red tape, more complaints from clients about red tape, and makes it more difficult for organizations to serve their clients. We test our hypotheses using data from the National Administrative Studies Project-Citizen, gathered on Amazon Mechanical Turk in late 2014 (n ¼ 1,254). The results support each of the hypotheses. The findings imply that managers may improve organizational performance by identifying and addressing the specific sources of administrative delay, rather than focusing on general perceptions of organizational red tape. KEYWORDS administrative delay; red tape; organizational performance A growing body of knowledge in public administration is concerned with shedding light on the association between pathological written rules or red tape and various other concepts at the level of the organization and the individual (Bozeman & Feeney, 2011; Brewer, Walker, Bozeman, Avellaneda, & Brewer Jr., 2012). For example, red tape has been studied in the contexts of organizational effectiveness (Pandey, Coursey, & Moynihan, 2007), organizational risk culture (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998), and public service motivation (Scott & Pandey, 2005). Yet, there is a dearth of research on predictors of red tape. This is where we seek to make our contribution. Earlier work on red tape argued that red tape is predicted by administrative delay of core organizational tasks, such as purchasing equipment, and hiring personnel (Bretschneider, 1990; Pandey & Bretschneider, 1997). The authors of those earlier studies were careful to underscore that administrative delay measures do not and cannot actually map the red tape concept space, because red tape is more than an administrative burden or delay alone. Rather, red tape "has no redeeming social value" (Bozeman, 1993, p. 283). In this study, we return to the idea of administrative delay as a CONTACT Wesley Kaufmann
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.