Cross-cultural perspectives have brought renewed interest in the social aspects of the self and the extent to which individuals define themselves in terms of their relationships to others and to social groups. This article provides a conceptual review of research and theory of the social self, arguing that the personal, relational, and collective levels of self-definition represent distinct forms of selfrepresentation with different origins, sources of self-worth, and social motivations. A set of 3 experiments illustrates haw priming of the interpersonal or collective "we" can alter spontaneous judgments of similarity and self-descriptions.

The distinction between relatively independent versus interdependent self-construals has been strongly associated with several important cultural differences in social behavior. The current studies examined the causal role of self-construal by investigating whether priming independent or interdependent self-construals within a culture could result in differences in psychological worldview that mirror those traditionally found between cultures. In Experiment 1, European-American participants primed with interdependence displayed shifts toward more collectivist social values and judgments that were mediated by corresponding shifts in self-construal. In Experiment 2, this effect was extended by priming students from the United States and Hong Kong with primes that were consistent and inconsistent with their predominant cultural worldview. Students who received the inconsistent primes were more strongly affected than those who received the consistent primes, and thus shifted self-construal, and corresponding values, to a greater degree.

All organisms must be capable of differentiating hostile from hospitable stimuli to survive. Typically, this evaluative discrimination is conceptualized as being bipolar (hostile-hospitable). This conceptualization is certainly evident in the area of attitudes, where the ubiquitous bipolar attitude measure, by gauging the net affective predisposition toward a stimulus, treats positive and negative evaluative processes as equivalent, reciprocally activated, and interchangeable. Contrary to conceptualizations of this evaluative process as bipolar, recent evidence suggests that distinguishable motivational systems underlie assessments of the positive and negative significance of a stimulus. Thus, a stimulus may vary in terms of the strength of positive evaluative activation and the strength of negative evaluative activation it evokes. Low activation of positive and negative evaluative processes by a stimulus reflects attitude neutrality or indifference, whereas high activation of positive and negative evaluative processes reflects attitude ambivalence. As such, attitudes can be represented more completely within a bivariate space than along a bipolar continuum. Evidence is reviewed showing that the positive and negative evaluative processes underlying many attitudes are distinguishable (stochastically and functionally independent), are characterized by distinct activation functions (positivity offset and negativity bias principles), are related differentially to attitude ambivalence (corollary of ambivalence asymmetries), have distinguishable antecedents (heteroscedacity principle), and tend to gravitate from a bivariate toward a bipolar structure when the underlying beliefs are the target of deliberation or a guide for behavior (principle of motivational certainty). The implications for society phenomena such as political elections and democratic structures are discussed.

The affect system has been shaped by the hammer and chisel of adaptation and natural selection such that form follows function. The characteristics of the system thus differ across the nervous system as a function of the unique constraints existent at each level. For instance, although physical limitations constrain behavioral expressions and incline behavioral predispositions toward a bipolar (good-bad, approach-withdraw) organization, these limiting conditions lose their power at the level of underlying mechanisms. According to the authors' model of evaluative space (J.

Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between self-regulatory processes that focus on promotion and prevention strategies for goal pursuit. Five studies provide support for the hypothesis that these strategies differ for individuals with distinct self-construals. Specifically, individuals with a dominant independent self-construal were predicted to place more emphasis on promotion-focused information, and those with a dominant interdependent self-construal on prevention-focused information. Support for this hypothesis was obtained for participants who scored high versus low on the Self-Construal Scale, participants who were presented with an independent versus interdependent situation, and participants from a Western versus Eastern culture. The influence of interdependence on regulatory focus was observed in both importance ratings of information and affective responses consistent with promotion or prevention focus.