This paper develops a two-echelon green supply chain that consists of one green manufacturer and one retailer. The green manufacturer has both online direct and offline retail channels. Considering manufacturer’s risk attitude and product’s green level, the paper constructs centralized and decentralized game models when the online channel’s demand is uncertain. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the impacts of a set of factors, including consumer environmental awareness (CEA), product green level, and risk attitude on decision-making in the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical examples. The main findings are as follows: the manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from the improvement of CEA; hence, they could invest more to obtain more profits by improving CEA; manufacturer’s risk attitude has a negative impact on the pricing and profits of the supply chain; as such, the members of the supply chain should improve the accuracy of their demand forecast, so as to minimize risks and losses resulting from uncertainty in demand.
The battery driving mileage on a single charge and convenience of the charging stations affect Electric Vehicle’s (EV) demand. This paper studies the optimal number of charging stations and EV’s price strategy considering different component commonality configurations. Assume the EV manufacturer provides two types of EV and the two EVs have the same battery configuration (battery as a common part) or the same naked vehicle–EV without batteries (naked vehicle as a common part). And the common part could be configured with low or high quality. We discuss four scenarios with different common parts and different quality levels. For each scenario, we present the optimal number of the charging stations and EV prices. Then we compare the optimal solutions and manufacturer’s profits in above four scenarios with numerical simulation and give some managerial insights. Our analysis reveals that (1) consumers’ range anxiety towards battery will affect manufacturer’s product configuration strategy, EVs’ prices and demands. (2) large consumers’ sensitivity towards charging station will corresponding to more charging station, high EV prices and demands. If consumers are very concerned about the charging convenience, high-end electric vehicles need to be launched first, then as customers’ anxiety about charging decreases, the low quality EV could be developed and diffused. (3) the unit product cost reduction caused by the commonality may increase or decrease the EVs’ prices, which depends on the relationship between the demand increment incurred by one more charging station and the cost coefficient of building the charging station. (4) The low quality naked vehicle as common component will increase both the number of the charging stations and the demand and the manufacturer is more likely to obtain high profits. (5) the cost saving coefficient of battery common parts has greater influence on the selection of commonality. When consumers’ range anxiety towards battery is very high, manufacturers should choose low-quality naked vehicles or high-quality battery as common components.
More and more green manufacturers are entering the market, which poses a challenge to ordinary manufacturers as to whether they must produce environmental products. Motivated by competition between green manufacturers and ordinary manufacturers, this study examines how an ordinary manufacturer that produces a traditional product (product 1) adapts its product portfolio to compete with a new-entrant green manufacturer. The sale period is divided into two periods. In period 1, the green manufacturer enters the market and provides one green product (product 2). Subsequently, the ordinary manufacturer decides whether to develop a green product (product 3) in period 2. The products are differentiated in two characteristics: traditional quality and environmental quality. We derive the demand function by comparing the consumer utility obtained from the three products. Then, we investigate the ordinary and green manufacturers’ optimal decisions using game theory. Furthermore, we study how government subsidy of green products affects the two manufacturers’ decisions. Finally, we extend our model to discuss the market position of the two green produc2ts when the green technology level is fixed for two manufacturers. Our study suggests that 1) the ordinary manufacturer may not introduce the green product when the difference in environmental quality between two green products is much larger; 2) government subsidy is effective in stimulating the ordinary manufacturer to introduce green product, especially when the traditional manufacturer could provide high-environmental-quality product; and 3) the manufacturer’s green technology level and green technology maturity, and consumers’ willingness to pay for traditional quality, together affect product position.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.