RFID technology is increasingly used in applications that require tracking, identification, and authentication. It attaches RFID-readable tags to objects for identification and execution of specific RFID-enabled applications. Recently, research has focused on the use of grouping-proofs for preserving privacy in RFID applications, wherein a proof of two or more tags must be simultaneously scanned. In 2010, a privacy-preserving grouping proof protocol for RFID based on ECC in public-key cryptosystem was proposed but was shown to be vulnerable to tracking attacks. A proposed enhancement protocol was also shown to have defects which prevented proper execution. In 2012, Lin et al. proposed a more efficient RFID ECC-based grouping proof protocol to promote inpatient medication safety. However, we found this protocol is also vulnerable to tracking and impersonation attacks. We then propose a secure privacy-preserving RFID grouping proof protocol for inpatient medication safety and demonstrate its resistance to such attacks.

An RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) system provides the mechanism to identify tags to readers and then to execute specific RFID-enabled applications. In those applications, secure protocols using lightweight cryptography need to be developed and the privacy of tags must be ensured. In 2010, Batina et al. proposed a privacy-preserving grouping proof protocol for RFID based on ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) in public-key cryptosystem. In the next year, Lv et al. had shown that Batina et al.’s protocol was insecure against the tracking attack such that the privacy of tags did not be preserved properly. Then they proposed a revised protocol based on Batina et al.’s work. Their revised protocol was claimed to have all security properties and resisted tracking attack. But in this paper, we prove that Lv et al.’s protocol cannot work properly. Then we propose a new version protocol with some nonce to satisfy the functions of Batina et al.’s privacy-preserving grouping proof protocol. Further we try the tracing attack made by Lv et al. on our protocol and prove our protocol can resist this attack to recover the untraceability

In 2010, Batina et al. proposed a privacy-preserving grouping proof protocol for RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) based on ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography). Recently, Lv et al. have shown that Batina et al.'s protocol is not secure against the tracking attack. Lv et al. also proposed an enhancement protocol based on Batina et al.'s work to against the tracking attack. In this paper we proved Lv et al.'s protocol can not work. We also present an improvement version of privacy-preserving ECC-based grouping-proof protocol to against the tracking attack.

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