China proposed a development direction of “new infrastructure” in 2020, due to the ongoing scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation. The charging station industry is one of the seven industries of the “new infrastructure”. Hence, it is of great importance to study China’s electric vehicle charging infrastructure industry. Based on game theory, this study analyzes the game strategies for the evolution of actors in China’s electric vehicle charging infrastructure industry. Firstly, the Chinese government has classified the industry according to the subsidy for charging piles and battery swapping stations. Then, the government, operators, and consumers constructed an evolutionary game model. The results show that: (1) under the investment subsidy mode, the purchase cost that consumers invest in purchasing traditional fuel-consuming vehicles has a positive impact on the operator’s production enthusiasm. In addition, the government’s subsidy amount has a positive impact on consumers’ decision to purchase battery-swappable electric vehicles; and (2) under the operational subsidy mode, due to the government’s strong supervision of the industry, there is a positive correlation between the word-of-mouth effect and the consumer’s decision to buy rechargeable electric vehicles.
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