We suggest a novel reason why there might be a need for female board representation.Female participation in the boardroom attenuates the CEO's overconfident views about his firm's prospects as we find that male CEOs at firms with female directors are less likely to hold deep-in-the-money options. Further, we argue that female board representation matters for industries where male CEO overconfidence is more prevalent. We find support for our argument as female directors are associated with less aggressive investment policies, better acquisition decisions, and improved financial performance for firms operating in industries with high overconfidence prevalence. We also identify a market failure around economic crises.Firms that do not have (sufficient) female board representation suffer a greater drop in performance as a result of the crisis than those that have female board representation.
This paper proposes a new semi-parametric identification and estimation approach to multinomial choice models in a panel data setting with individual fixed effects. Our approach is based on cyclic monotonicity, which is a defining convex-analytic feature of the random utility framework underlying multinomial choice models. From the cyclic monotonicity property, we derive identifying inequalities without requiring any shape restrictions for the distribution of the random utility shocks. These inequalities point identify model parameters under straightforward assumptions on the covariates. We propose a consistent estimator based on these inequalities.
Using the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across US states, we find that banks with directors whose legal duties are expanded to consider stakeholder and long-term interests significantly reduce risktaking by increasing capital and shifting to safer borrowers. Additionally, we find that the effect of statute enactment on bank performance is insignificant on average but significantly positive for banks that take excessive risk. Furthermore, we find that banks that previously received a statute enactment fared significantly better during the crises. Our findings support the increasing calls for greater emphasis on stakeholder interests amidst the current bank regulatory and governance reforms.
This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.
This paper proposes a new semi-parametric identification and estimation approach to multinomial choice models in a panel data setting with individual fixed effects. Our approach is based on cyclic monotonicity, which is a defining feature of the random utility framework underlying multinomial choice models. From the cyclic monotonicity property, we derive identifying inequalities without requiring any shape restrictions for the distribution of the random utility shocks. These inequalities point identify model parameters under straightforward assumptions on the covariates. We propose a consistent estimator based on these inequalities.
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