The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and stateindependent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases. A remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences. New applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative examples, including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model.
This paper offers a resolution to an extensively studied question in theoretical economics: which measure spaces are suitable for modeling many economic agents? We propose the condition of "nowhere equivalence" to characterize those measure spaces that can be effectively used to model the space of many agents. In particular, this condition is shown to be more general than various approaches that have been proposed to handle the shortcoming of the Lebesgue unit interval as an agent space. We illustrate the minimality of the nowhere equivalence condition by showing its necessity in deriving the determinateness property, the existence of equilibria, and the closed graph property for equilibrium correspondences in general equilibrium theory and game theory.
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