Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Most studies of charitable giving only examine total charitable contributions. This paper finds that contributions to religious organizations should be studied separately from contributions to nonreligious organizations. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions that religious giving is fundamentally different from nonreligious giving. Religious giving is assumed to directly influence afterlife consumption, while nonreligious giving is not related to after-life consumption. While contributions to both increase with income, contributions to religious organizations also increase with age. There is no relationship between age and contributions to nonreligious organizations. Also, as income rises, religious contributions fall as a share of total giving.

The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was recently introduced by the Federal Reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral. We evaluate one aspect of the program -the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between Treasury collateral and lower quality collateral. We find that TSLF operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. More refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the program's effectiveness. Various additional tests, including a split sample test, suggest that our findings are robust.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities--the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)--that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008-09. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and--in the case of the TSLF--at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. There also appear to be some interaction effects between financial performance and balance sheet liquidity in explaining dealer behavior. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. 1 Repo rates can be of various terms and are backed by various types of collateral. The over-night Treasury GC repo rate represents the rate on the shortest term for the safest and most liquid type of collateral. As such, this rate is a benchmark for other repo rates. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may 2Treasury securities as part of its Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program. While the SFP, OMOs, and programs such as TARP were not aimed directly at dislocations in short-term money markets, they did impact the supply of Treasury securities available to be financed by money markets.In general, greater amounts of available Treasury collateral should lead to higher Treasury repo rates, however while all Treasury collateral can be used as high quality repo collateral, it does not necessarily follow that it will be. Our findings strongly support the idea that the propensity for any given Treasury obligation to support repo market activity differs systematically by source.All Treasury securities are of equal quality as collateral, and yet each program we study had different transmission channels, different initiation periods, and different patterns of changes in supply, so that each program's relative impact on the over-night Treasury GC repo market can be identified. Thus this paper contributes to the collective understanding of short-term money markets and hereby seeks to inform policy responses to future crises.In addition to studying the effects of Treasury collateral supply on collateralized funding rates, this study is related to other work on short-term money markets as well as to other studies examining the impact of various programs which were introduced over the course of 2007-2009 to address the multiple dislocations in financial markets. 2 One unique aspect of our study is that we examine both monetary and fiscal policy responses 2 For a sample of such studies, see Gagnon et. al.