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Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions is very difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis to test whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour of laboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.

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This paper uses Social Security records to study internal migration in Spain. This is the rst paper that uses this data source, which has some advantages with respect to existing data sources: it includes only job-seeking migrants and it allows to identify temporary migration.Within the framework of an extended gravity model, we estimate a Generalized Negative Binomial regression on gross migration ows between provinces. We quantify the e ect of local labor market imbalances on workers' mobility and discuss the equilibrating role of internal migration in Spain. Our main results show that the e ect of employment opportunities have c hanged after 1984; migrants seem to be more responsive to economic conditions but, consistently with previous studies for the Spanish labor market, the migration response to wage di erentials is wrongly signed. Our analysis also con rms the larger internal mobility of highly quali ed workers.