This article describes the nature and significance of the distinction between the emotions of envy and jealousy and reports 2 experiments that empirically investigated it. In Experiment 1, Ss recalled a personal experience of either envy or jealousy. In Experiment 2, Ss read 1 of a set of stories in which circumstances producing envy and jealousy were manipulated independently in a factorial design. Both experiments introduced new methodologies to enhance their sensitivity, and both revealed qualitative differences between the 2 emotions. Envy was characterized by feelings of inferiority, longing, resentment, and disapproval of the emotion. Jealousy was characterized by fear of loss, distrust, anxiety, and anger. The practical importance of this distinction, the reasons for its confusion, and general issues regarding the empirical differentiation of emotions are discussed.

Although many scholars have argued that individual differences in proneness to envy can have wide-ranging implications for social interactions, the empirical testing of these claims is largely undeveloped. We created a single-factor Dispositional Envy Scale (DES) to measure individual differences in tendencies to envy, and examined some of the implications of such differences. Study 1 indicated that the DES is a reliable, stable measure, containing items suiting theoretical criteria for the makeup of dispositional envy. Study 2 supported the construct validity of the DES by showing that it is correlated with other individual difference measures in theoretically compatible ways. Studies 3 and 4 supplied diverse ways of establishing the criterion-related validity of the DES by showing that it moderated envious responses to another person’s superiority and that it predicted envy beyond other correlated individual measures of neuroticism, self-esteem, cynical hostility, and socially desirable responding.

Although scholarly traditions assume that shame results more from the public exposure of a transgression or incompetence than guilt does, this distinction has little empirical support. Four studies, using either undergraduate participants' responses to hypothetical scenarios, their remembered experiences, or the coding of literary passages, reexamined this issue. Supporting traditional claims, public exposure of both moral (transgressions) and nonmoral (incompetence) experiences was associated more with shame than with guilt. Shame was also more strongly linked with nonmoral experiences of inferiority, suggesting 2 core features of shame: its links with public exposure and with negative self-evaluation. The distinctive features of guilt included remorse, self-blame, and the private feelings associated with a troubled conscience.

The effect of mood on memory was studied under natural conditions in 2 field quasi-experiments. In both, Ss in happy moods recalled autobiographical memories that were more negative than were memories recalled by subjects in bad moods, a phenomenon termed mood incongmeni recall. Three subsequent laboratory experiments are reported that suggest that mood incongruent recall is a reliable phenomenon, occurring when subjects are unaware that their moods are relevant to the experiment. Mood incongruent recall is hypothesized to be related to mood regulation. The implications of these findings for the relation between mood and memory, for mood congruent recall, for laboratory mood inductions, and for self-regulation of mood and depression are discussed.

Two hypotheses concerning the hostile and depressive components of envy were tested: that hostile feelings are associated with a subjective belief that the envy-producing difference is unfair and that depressive feelings are associated with a sense of inferiority evoked by the envied person's advantage. Subjects wrote autobiographical accounts of experiences of envy and then indicated how unfair (in both a subjective and an objective sense) they believed the envied person's advantage was, how inferior the advantage made them feel, and how hostile and depressed they felt. Multiple regression analysis generally supported the hypotheses. Hostile feelings were predicted by subjective injustice beliefs and objective injustice beliefs but not by inferiority beliefs. Depressive feelings, however, were predicted largely by inferiority beliefs but also by subjective injustice beliefs. Envy, especially in its typically hostile form, may need to be understood as resulting in part from a subjective, yet robust, sense of injustice.

Consensus that emotions are functional and adaptive has reached such a level that contradictory evidence is no longer seriously considered, and the complex determinants of functionality are not fully appreciated. To remedy this complacency, the author draws attention to the nontrivial amount of dysfunctional emotion in everyday life, as well as to the many long-standing philosophical and religious traditions that counsel dispassion. This exercise is useful for tempering functionalist zeal and restoring scientific skepticism. It also demonstrates that the functionality of emotions depends critically on the appraisals that give rise to emotions, the choice and control of the behaviors motivated by emotions, and the socialization and training of emotions. These parameters, whether or not they are considered part of an emotion, must be considered part of what makes emotions functional.

We present 2 studies on being envied. Study 1 used an emotional narrative methodology. We asked 44 Spanish (23 women, 21 men) and 48 European American (36 women, 12 men) participants to tell us about a recent experience in which others envied them. We classified the antecedents, relationship context, markers of envy, coping strategies, and positive and negative implications of being envied. In Study 2, 174 Spanish (88 women, 86 men) and 205 European American (106 women, 99 men) participants responded to a situation in which they had something someone else wanted. We manipulated the object of desire (academic achievement or having "a better life"). We measured individual differences in orientation to achievement (i.e., vertical individualism), cooperation and interpersonal harmony (i.e., horizontal collectivism), a zero-sum view of success, beliefs that success begets hostile coveting, fear of success, and dispositional envy. We also measured participants' appraisals, positive and negative emotions, and coping strategies. The findings from both studies indicate that being envied has both positive (e.g., increased self-confidence) and negative consequences (e.g., fear of ill will from others). Being envied had more positive and more negative psychological and relational consequences among those participants who were achievement oriented (European Americans) than among participants who were oriented to cooperation and interpersonal harmony (Spanish).

No abstract