Lack of adequate knowledge on forest-people interaction is an important reason for the failure of many conservation policies. This study focuses on the behavior of peripheral communities towards non-timber forest product (NTFP) harvesting by estimating the demand functions for NTFP. The paper develops a theoretical model for deriving the shadow price for NTFP using time allocation among different economic activities. Then it tests the competitive time allocation hypothesis between NTFP extraction and tea plantations, the predominant agricultural sector in the vicinity of Sinharaja rain forest. Results provide statistical evidence for the existence of competitive time allocation between tea plantations and NTFP extraction. Own-price elasticities are consistently inelastic, except for one product. As indicated by the inelastic responses, pricing policies may not be very useful in manipulating subsistence NTFP extraction. Repeating similar studies for commercial NTFPs is encouraged.

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This paper demonstrates the variety of institutional arrangements affecting smallscale fishing in southern Sri Lanka, highlighting legal pluralism and focusing particularly on its consequences for livelihoods and resource conservation. Evidence derives from two landing centres in Hambantota District, and is grouped according to three institutional types: norms, community working rules and state working rules. The authors argue that these institutions play differential roles in providing access to fishing, preventing conflict, structuring fishing operations, reducing risks and conserving resources. Interactions between state and community legal systems consist of four types -indifference, competition, accommodation and mutual support. Institutional effectiveness is threatened most where implementation is poor or rules are in direct competition.