has argued that Anthony Quinton in his paper on 'Punishment' (pp. 83-88 in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 1st series, cd. P. Laslett) failed to give a satisfactory analysis of the retributivist thesis. The retributivist is concerned to say that society is only morally entitled to punish X, if X is guilty of an offence: this is to claim more than that society is only logically entitled to punish X, if X is guilty. Therefore the essence of retributivism is not, as Quinton suggests, merely concerned with the 'use' or 'misuse 5 of a word. However, the suspicion that retributivists are concerned with something more than logic may also have made itself felt in Quintan's mind when he states that the essential contribution of retributivism-i.e. that punishment is only justifiable by guilt-is normally held in conjunction with certain other propositions. But these propositions, he writes, 'are logically, if not altogether psychologically, independent of it' (p. 84). The three which he lists are: (1) the function of punishment is the negation or annulment of evil; (2) punishment must fit the crime, and (3) the offenders as moral agents have the right to punishment. Now, I feel, it should be : stressed that if retributivists are to argue for the justification of punishment then their case is somewhat weakened if these propositions are to be dismissed as mere appendages to the main contention that only offenders, or only those pronounced 'guilty', can be punished. But my concern in this paper is with the last proposition, namely, that offenders have the right to punishment. I hope to so construe it that it will provide, or bring out, a further moral point in a theory of punishment which differs from the ultraretributive. The view that punishment can be sufficiently justified by the guilt of the offenders is what I designate as ultra-retributive. The right of an offender to punishment is regarded by Quinton as 'an odd sort of right whose holders would strenuously resist its recognition'; and that strictly interpreted it 'is utilitarian and. .. also immoral* because it entails that the only consideration is the moral regeneration of the offender. This concern neglects 'the rights of an offender's victims to compensation and of society in general to protection' (p. 85). If the expression 'the right to punishment' is construed to mean the right to 'moral regeneration' to the exclusion of all else, then it does not make much sense and I would not be disposed to quarrel with anyone who said so. A less extreme interpretation, which Quinton regards as reasonable enough, is that 'we should never treat offenders merely as means in inflicting punishment but should take into account their right to treatment as moral agents'. I am not quite certain as to the meaning which Quinton 11 Anthony Quinton on Punishment', Analysis 20.1, October 1959.
