In contemporary Western moral philosophy literature that discusses the Chinese ethical tradition, it is a commonplace practice to use the Chinese term daode 道德 as a technical translation of the English term moral. The present study provides some empirical evidence showing a discrepancy between the terms moral and daode. There is a much more pronounced difference between prototypically immoral and prototypically uncultured behaviors in English (USA) than between prototypically bu daode 不道德 and prototypically bu wenming 不文明 behaviors in Mandarin Chinese (Mainland China). If the Western concept of immorality is defined in contraposition to things that are matters of etiquette or conventional norms and thus tied to a more or less tangible moral / conventional distinction, then we are dealing with a different structure in Mandarin Chinese-the prototypically bu daode and bu wenming behaviors seem to largely overlap. We also discuss whether bu lunli 不倫理 and bu hefa 不合法 can be considered adequate candidates for translation of immorality and we answer in the negative.
In this article, we report a cross‐cultural study on how different types of social transgressions are moralised by Chinese, Americans, and Lithuanians. We hypothesised that given the continuing influences of Confucian worldview on contemporary Chinese societies, the Chinese will not make a distinction between moral (daode 道德) and conventional cultural norms (wenming 文明). Following Turiel’s moral/conventional task, we characterised moral transgressions in terms of two dimensions: Their wrongness is perceived to be independent of any authorities’ opinion and general in scope. The results indicate that Chinese participants were slightly more “moralising” than Americans and Lithuanians in the typical (Haidtean) moral domains. More importantly, unlike Americans and Lithuanians, the Chinese strongly moralised uncultured (wenming 文明) behaviour. Results also indicate that explicit considerations about purity were quite important across all three cultural groups. These mixed results are discussed in the light of recent debates about the scope of morality and the moral/conventional distinction.
(Buchtel et al. 2015). Viena svarbiausių jų išvadų yra ta, kad Vakaruose moralinio pasmerkimo sulaukia visų pirma tie veiksmai, kurie yra suvokiami
In this paper we report a study on how different types of normatively relevant transgressions are evaluated by Chinese participants. We hypothesized that, given the continuing influences of Confucian worldview on contemporary Chinese societies, the Chinese will not make a distinction between moral (daode) and conventional norms of cultured behavior (wenming). Our results indicate that Chinese participants expressed a strong normative conviction not only towards harmful and unfair actions, usually subsumed under the moral domain in Western literature, but also towards violations of what would be widely accepted as conventional (or cultural) norms. Similarly, Chinese participants expressed a strong normative conviction towards violations of the traditional Chinese value of family reverence (xiao), thus further supporting our general thesis. Moreover, results indicate that, overall, explicit considerations of wenming (unculturedness) emerged as the best predictor of a normative conviction response among the Chinese. Though considerations of harm and fairness also emerged as significant predictors of normative conviction response. The results are discussed in the light of recent debates about the moral/conventional distinction and the scope of morality.
The article asks why, in Western universities, the success of the academic field of comparative philosophy has so far failed to significantly diversify the curricula of academic philosophy. It suggests that comparative philosophy has mainly relied on the same approaches that have made academic philosophy Eurocentric, namely, on the history of philosophy as the main mode of teaching and researching philosophy. Further, post-comparative philosophy and transcultural studies are presented as providing tools to address the foundations of the institutional parochialism of academic philosophy, while preserving one of the most fundamental tenets of philosophy—the quest for universal knowledge that transcends cultural particularities.
Contemporary Western discourse on freedom and choice – some of the most championed modern values – is usually anchored in the concept cluster of free will and autonomous choice. In turn, academic research on free will in philosophy (including experimental philosophy) and psychology is largely based on a limited conceptual framework with roots in particular debates in Christianity and European philosophy. This framework is currently challenged by multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches applied in the fields of area and Asian studies, comparative philosophy, and also empirical research in cross-cultural psychology, and anthropology. One reason for this challenge is that the dominant Western academic approach, with its almost exclusive focus on concepts of free will and causal determinism, neglects the multitude of non-Western cultural traditions. In most parts of the world, these traditions continue to shape everyday practices and conceptualizations of free action, choice, and decision. Traditions also provide various strategies for navigating the constraints on human agency.In the present multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary conference, we invited scholars from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, Asian studies, religious studies and other related fields to discuss theoretical alternatives to the dominant framework that are sensitive to cultural differences and local contexts as well as empirical research – especially crosscultural and cross-linguistic – on conceptualizations of free and constrained action and cultural practices in dealing with these constraints.This project “Between choice and determinism: cultural variations in experiencing and conceptualizing free will, luck and randomness” has received funding from European Social Fund (project No. 09.3.3-LMT-K-712-01-0111) under grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT).
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