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This paper analyses the relationship between monetary freedom (index measured by the Heritage Foundation) and real economic growth of 11 new member states of the European Union. 19-year panel data regression with fixed effects over the period of 1997-2015 reveals that the real GDP growth of the selected countries is positively affected by the degree of monetary freedom. However, the relationship between monetary freedom and real GDP growth has weakened after the global recession of 2008. Monetary freedom was not jeopardized during the crisis, while real GDP growth declined significantly in most of economies studied. Monetarna Sloboda I Gospodarski Rast U Novim Članicama Europske Unije SAŽETAKU radu se analizira odnos između monetarne slobode i gospodarskog rasta u 11 zemalja novih članica Europske unije. Uporabom devetnaestogodišnjih panel podataka (od 1997 do 2015) regresiona analiya sa fidkim efektima upućuje na zaključak da je na rast realnog GDP izabranih zemalja pozitivno uticao stupanj monetarne slobode. Međutim, veza između monetarne slobode i rasta realnog GDP slabi nakon globalne recesije iz 2008. Monetarne slobode nisu bile ugrožene tokom krize, dok je realni GDP u većini izabranih zemalja značajno opao.

Normally, privatisation is seen as beneficial. In the case of Serbia, the results are disappointing. This paper considers the failure of privatisation in Serbia-a latecomer in the matter-where privatisation was partly a result of exogenous pressures. In Serbia, a sizeable number of privatised firms were bought by bureaucrats and politicians and all firms were subjected to a period of supervision. We argue that this process of privatisation was designed to allow rentseekers to conserve their privileges through asset stripping and that this explains the failure. In order to do so, we perform empirical analysis of the determinants of liquidation, merger and bankruptcy of privatised firms from 2002 to 2015. We construct a novel data set from primary sources, free of the 'survivorship bias' and containing proxies for various types of owners, indirect signs of asset stripping strategy and a broad range of controls. Our results indicate that firms owned by politicians face significantly higher risks of bankruptcy, especially after the end of supervision.

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