The corporate governance system of the insurance industry in Taiwan, which holds board members fully responsible for cases of bankruptcy, offers an interesting environment in which to explore its unique regulatory impact on insurers' efficiency. Using a unique panel data from Taiwan, this paper investigates whether corporate governance variables -including insider ownership, voting rights, cash-flow rights, and board composition -influence the efficiency performance of insurance companies. The analysis suggests that a high concentration of voting rights and cash-flow rights in controlling shareholders' ownership has prevailed in Taiwan's insurance industry. Our overall evidence shows that corporate governance plays an important role in influencing efficiency for property-liability insurers in Taiwan. Specifically, insider ownership, cash-flow rights, and the presence of outside directors have positive impacts, whereas concentrated ownership, deviation between voting rights and cash-flow rights, board size, and the presence of CEO duality have negative impacts on insurers' efficiency.

This article uses the nonparametric frontier method to examine differences in efficiency for three unique organizational forms in the Japanese nonlife insurance industry-keiretsu firms, nonspecialized independent firms (NSIFs), and specialized independent firms (SIFs). It is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that efficiencies are equal, with one exception. Keiretsu firms seem to be more cost-efficient than NSIFs. The results have important implications for the stakeholders of the NSIFs. An examination of the productivity changes across the different organizational forms reveals deteriorating efficiency for all three types of firms throughout the 1985-1994 sample period. Finally, the evidence also suggests that the value-added approach and the financial intermediary approach provide different but complementary results. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.

This article examines the efficiency changes of U.S. life insurers before and after demutualization in the 1980s and 1990s. We use two frontier approaches (the value-added approach and the financial intermediary approach) to measure the efficiency changes. In addition, we use Malmquist indices to investigate the efficiency and productivity change of converted life insurers over time. The results using the value-added approach indicate that demutualized life insurers improve their efficiency before demutualization. On the other hand, the evidence using the financial intermediary approach shows the efficiency of the demutualized life insurers relative to mutual control insurers deteriorates before demutualization and improves after conversion. The difference in the results between the two approaches is due to the fact that the financial intermediary approach considers financial conditions. The results of both approaches suggest that there is no efficiency improvement after demutualization relative to stock control insurers. There is, however, efficiency improvement relative to mutual control insurers when the financial intermediary approach is used. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2007.

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We examine the impact of deregulation and liberalization (D&L) on the efficiency of the Taiwanese life insurance industry from 1981 to 2004. We utilize the data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency performances and the Malmquist index approach to measure changes in efficiency and productivity over time. Both the DEA and Malmquist results show that the old domestic firms have been slightly impacted by the new competitors around 1992-1994 (the end of foreign and new local entry period and the beginning of post-D&L period). More important, our results show that the D&L does not have major adverse impact on the technical, cost, and revenue efficiency performances of existing domestic firms in the long run. The dominance of existing domestic firms has declined but persists throughout the sample period. In addition, our results show that it is relatively easy for new firms to become technically efficient in just few years after entering the market, but it is more difficult for them to become efficient in cost and revenue efficiency. We, thus, suggest that a new market entrant should take advantage of the existing mechanisms by acquiring an old (existing) firm, rather than establish a new one, if a new entrant wants to become efficient in cost and revenue efficiency in a short time.