While conspiracy ideation has attracted overdue attention from social scientists in recent years, little work focuses on how different pro-conspiracy messages affect the take-up of conspiracy beliefs. In this study, we compare the effect of explicit and implicit conspiracy cues on the adoption of conspiracy beliefs. We also examine whether corrective information can undo conspiracy cues, and whether there are differences in the effectiveness of corrective information based on whether a respondent received an explicit or implicit conspiracy cue. We examine these questions using a real-world but low-salience conspiracy theory concerning Zika, GM mosquitoes, and vaccines. Using a preregistered experiment (N = 1018: https://osf.io/ hj2pw/), we find that both explicit and implicit conspiracy cues increase conspiracy beliefs, but in both cases corrections are generally effective. We also find reception of an explicit conspiracy cue and its correction is conditional on feelings toward the media and pharmaceutical companies. Finally, we find that examining open-ended conspiracy belief items reveals similar patterns, but with a few key differences. These findings have implications for how news media cover controversial public health issues going forward. Conspiracy cues in the public sphere People commonly encounter information relating to supposed conspiracies (Del Vicario et al., 2016). While some conspiracy CONTACT

Numeric political appeals represent a prevalent but overlooked domain of public opinion research. When can quantitative information change political attitudes, and is this change trumped by partisan effects? We analyze how numeracy-or individual differences in citizens' ability to process and apply numeric policy information-moderates the effectiveness of numeric political appeals on a moderately salient policy issue. Results show that those low in numeracy exhibit a strong party-cue effect, treating numeric information in a superficial and heuristic fashion. Conversely, those high in numeracy are persuaded by numeric information, even when it is sponsored by the opposing party, overcoming the party-cue effect. Our results make clear that overlooking numeric ability when analyzing quantitative political appeals can mask significant persuasion effects, and we build on recent work advancing the understanding of individual differences in public opinion.

Fact-checking has spread internationally, in part to confront the rise of digital disinformation campaigns. American studies suggests ideological asymmetry in attitudes toward fact-checking, as well as greater acceptance of the practice among those more interested in and knowledgeable about politics. We examine attitudes toward fact-checking across six European counties to put these findings in a broader context ( N = 6,067). We find greater familiarity with and acceptance of fact-checking in Northern Europe (Sweden and Germany) than elsewhere (Italy, Spain, France, and Poland). We further find two dimensions of political antipathy: a left–right dimension and an “anti-elite” dimension (including dissatisfaction with democracy and negative feelings toward the European Union), the latter of which more consistently predicts negative feelings toward fact-checkers in the countries examined. Our findings demonstrate that despite general acceptance of the movement, significant political divides remain. Those less likely to trust fact-checkers could be more vulnerable to disinformation targeting these divides, leading to a spiral of cynicism.