Why do countries as similar as the industrialized OECD countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation? The answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances, nor from the principles of optimal taxation, but rather from politics. This article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers. The electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts. What seems to matter most, it is found, is the effect of the durability of governments. Governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices. Such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties. Central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance, irrespective of the political institutions. In fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline. These findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation, but also

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This paper studies determinants and effects of capital controls using a panel of 61 developed and developing countries. The results suggest that capital account restrictions are more likely to be in place in countries with low income, a large share of government, and where the central bank is not independent. Other determinants of controls include the exchange rate regime, current account imbalances and the degree of openness of the economy. We also find that capital controls and other foreign exchange restrictions are associated with higher inflation and lower real interest rates. We do not find any robust correlation between our measures of controls and the rate of growth, although there is evidence that countries with large black market premia grow more slowly.

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