In this paper, we take an axiomatic approach to characterize insurance prices in a competitive market setting. We present four axioms to describe the behavior of market insurance prices. From these axioms it follows that the price of an insurance risk has a Choquet integral representation with respect to a distorted probability, (Yanri, 1987). We propose an additional axiom for reducing compound risks. This axiom determines that the distortion function is a power function.
This paper examines the optimal annuitization, investment and consumption strategies of a utility-maximizing retiree facing a stochastic time of death under a variety of institutional restrictions. We focus on the impact of aging on the optimal purchase of life annuities which form the basis of most Defined Benefit pension plans. Due to adverse selection, acquiring a lifetime payout annuity is an irreversible transaction that creates an incentive to delay. Under the institutional all-or-nothing arrangement where annuitization must take place at one distinct point in time (i.e. retirement), we derive the optimal age at which to annuitize and develop a metric to capture the loss from annuitizing prematurely. In contrast, under an openmarket structure where individuals can annuitize any fraction of their wealth at anytime, we locate a general optimal annuity purchasing policy. In this case, we find that an individual will initially annuitize a lump sum and then buy annuities to keep wealth to one side of a separating ray in wealth-annuity space. We believe our paper is the first to integrate life annuity products into the portfolio choice literature while taking into account realistic institutional restrictions which are unique to the market for mortality-contingent claims. r
We determine the optimal investment strategy of an individual who targets a given rate of consumption and who seeks to minimize the probability of going bankrupt before she dies, also known as lifetime ruin. We impose two types of borrowing constraints: First, we do not allow the individual to borrow money to invest in the risky asset nor to sell the risky asset short. However, the latter is not a real restriction because in the unconstrained case, the individual does not sell the risky asset short. Second, we allow the individual to borrow money but only at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on the riskless asset.We consider two forms of the consumption function: (1) The individual consumes at a constant (real) dollar rate, and (2) the individual consumes a constant proportion of her wealth. The first is arguably more realistic, but the second is closely connected with Merton's model of optimal consumption and investment under power utility. We demonstrate that connection in this paper, as well as include a numerical example to illustrate our results.
We provide an overview of how the law of large numbers breaks down when pricing life-contingent claims under stochastic as opposed to deterministic mortality (probability, hazard) rates. In a stylized situation, we derive the limiting per-policy risk and show that it goes to a non-zero constant. This is in contrast to the classical situation when the underlying mortality decrements are known with certainty, per policy risk goes to zero. We decompose the standard deviation per policy into systematic and non-systematic components, akin to the analysis of individual stock (equity) risk in a Markowitz portfolio framework. Finally, we draw upon the financial analogy of the Sharpe Ratio to develop a premium pricing methodology under aggregate mortality risk. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2006.
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