Despite evidence of widespread belief in conspiracy theories, there remains a dearth of research on the individual difference correlates of conspiracist ideation. In two studies, we sought to overcome this limitation by examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and a range of individual psychological factors. In Study 1, 817 Britons indicated their agreement with conspiracist ideation concerning the July 7, 2005 (7/7), London bombings, and completed a battery of individual difference scales. Results showed that stronger belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories was predicted by stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, greater exposure to conspiracist ideation, higher political cynicism, greater support for democratic principles, more negative attitudes to authority, lower self-esteem, and lower Agreeableness. In Study 2, 281 Austrians indicated their agreement with an entirely fictitious conspiracy theory and completed a battery of individual difference measures not examined in Study 1. Results showed that belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. These results are discussed in terms of the potential of identifying individual difference constellations among conspiracy theorists.

Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2-4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.

Given the widespread appeal of conspiratorial beliefs, it is surprising that very little empirical research has examined the psychological variables associated with such beliefs. In the present study, we examined individual and demographic predictors of beliefs in conspiracy theories concerning the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon among a representative British sample of 254 women and men. Results of structural equation modelling showed that 9/11 conspiracist beliefs were positively associated with belief in other conspiracy theories, exposure to 9/11 conspiracist ideas, political cynicism, defiance of authority and the Big Five personality factor of Agreeableness. In total, a model including demographics, personality and individual difference variables explained over 50% of the variance in 9/11 conspiracist ideas. The implications of these findings for the literature on conspiracy theories are discussed.

This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,434 individuals in 10 major world regions about body weight ideals and body dissatisfaction. Participants completed the female Contour Drawing Figure Rating Scale (CDFRS) and self-reported their exposure to Western and local media. Results indicated there were significant cross-regional differences in the ideal female figure and body dissatisfaction, but effect sizes were small across high-socioeconomic-status (SES) sites. Within cultures, heavier bodies were preferred in low-SES sites compared to high-SES sites in Malaysia and South Africa (ds = 1.94-2.49) but not in Austria. Participant age, body mass index (BMI), and Western media exposure predicted body weight ideals. BMI and Western media exposure predicted body dissatisfaction among women. Our results show that body dissatisfaction and desire for thinness is commonplace in high-SES settings across world regions, highlighting the need for international attention to this problem.

The Sociocultural Attitudes Towards Appearance Questionnaire-3 (SATAQ-3) and its earlier versions are measures designed to assess societal and interpersonal aspects of appearance ideals.Correlational, structural equation modeling, and prospective studies of the SATAQ-3 have shown consistent and significant associations with measures of body image disturbance and eating pathology. In the current investigation, the SATAQ-3 was revised to improve upon some conceptual limitations and was evaluated in four US and three international female samples, as well as a US male sample. In Study 1, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for a sample of women from the Southeastern US (N = 859) indicated a 22-item scale with five factors: Study 2 replicated the factorial validity, reliability, and convergent validity of the SATAQ-4 in an international sample of women drawn from Italy, England, and Australia (N = 362). Study 3 examined a sample of college males from the US (N = 271); the five-factor solution was largely replicated, yet there was some evidence of an underlying structure unique to men. Future research avenues include additional item testing and modification of the scale for men, as well as adaptation of the measure for children and adolescents.Keywords: SATAQ, internalization, appearance ideals, sociocultural pressure, measurement, body image, eating disturbance. DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF THE SATAQ-4 5 Development and Validation of the Sociocultural AttitudesTowards Appearance Research has demonstrated an array of negative consequences associated with body image disturbance and eating pathology (e.g., decreased self-esteem, negative affect, unhealthy weight control practices, and serious medical complications) (Grossbard, Lee, Neighbors, & Larimer, 2009; Mellor, Fuller-Tyszkie, McCabe, & Ricciardelli, 2010;Mintz & Betz, 1988;Rodin, Silberstein, & Striegel-Moore, 1984;Stice, 2002). Consequently, researchers have sought to understand the etiology and maintenance of these disorders in order to illuminate potential points of intervention (Cash & Smolak, 2011;Stice, 2002). One prominent etiological model that has received strong empirical support is the tripartite influence model (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999), which is based on socioculturual theories of body image disturbance and disordered eating (Keel & Forney, 2013;Tiggemann, 2011). This model posits that individuals are pressured by powerful social agents (i.e., peers, family, and the media) to adhere to culturally-sanctioned appearance ideals, which emphasize thinness for women and muscularity for men. These social pressures are proposed to lead individuals to internalize relevant appearance ideals (i.e., to set the ideal as one's own personal standard of attractiveness).Internalization of the often unattainable ideal is thought to lead to body dissatisfaction,which is an established risk factor for unhealthy weight control practices and disordered eating (Thompson, Schaefer, & Menzel, 2012).Because females report higher le...

ObjectivesExplore how patient-reported experience measures (PREMs) are collected, communicated and used to inform quality improvement (QI) across healthcare settings.DesignSystematic review.SettingVarious primary and secondary care settings, including general practice, and acute and chronic care hospitals.ParticipantsA full range of patient populations from (children through to the elderly) and staff (from healthcare practitioners to senior managers).MethodsScientific databases were searched (CINAHL, PsycINFO, MEDLINE and Cochrane Libraries) as was grey literature. Qualitative and quantitative studies describing collection of PREM data and subsequent QI actions in any healthcare setting were included. Risk of bias was assessed using established criteria. Of 5312 initial hits, 32 full texts were screened, and 11 were included.ResultsPatient experience data were most commonly collected through surveys and used to identify small areas of incremental change to services that do not require a change to clinician behaviour (eg, changes to admission processes and producing educational materials). While staff in most studies reported having made effective improvements, authors struggled to identify what those changes were or the impact they had.ConclusionsFindings suggest there is no single best way to collect or use PREM data for QI, but they do suggest some key points to consider when planning such an approach. For instance, formal training is recommended, as a lack of expertise in QI and confidence in interpreting patient experience data effectively may continue to be a barrier to a successful shift towards a more patient-centred healthcare service. In the context of QI, more attention is required on how patient experience data will be used to inform changes to practice and, in turn, measure any impact these changes may have on patient experience.

A number scales have been developed to measure conspiracist ideation, but little attention has been paid to the factorial validity of these scales. We reassessed the psychometric properties of four widely-used scales, namely the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (OICM). Eight-hundred-and-three U.S. adults completed all measures, along with measures of endorsement of 9/11 and anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we found that only the BCTI had acceptable factorial validity. We failed to confirm the factor structures of the CMQ and the GBCS, suggesting these measures had poor factorial validity. Indices of convergent validity were acceptable for the BCTI, but weaker for the other measures. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions for the future refinement in the measurement of conspiracist ideation.

Two studies examined correlates of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory among Malays in Malaysia, a culture in which state-directed conspiracism as a means of dealing with perceived external and internal threats is widespread. In Study 1, 368 participants from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, completed a novel measure of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and anomie. Initial analysis showed that the novel scale factorially reduced to a single dimension. Further analysis showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was only significantly associated with general conspiracist ideation, but the strength of the association was weak. In Study 2, 314 participants completed the measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory, along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and ideological attitudes. Results showed that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was associated with anti-Israeli attitudes, modern racism directed at the Chinese, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. General conspiracist ideation did not emerge as a significant predictor once other variables had been accounted for. These results suggest that there may be specific cultural and social psychological forces that drive belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory within the Malaysian context. Specifically, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian Malays appears to serve ideological needs and as a mask for anti-Chinese sentiment, which may in turn reaffirm their perceived ability to shape socio-political processes.