Reinforcement learning theory powerfully characterizes how we learn to benefit ourselves. In this theory, prediction errors-the difference between a predicted and actual outcome of a choice-drive learning. However, we do not operate in a social vacuum. To behave prosocially we must learn the consequences of our actions for other people. Empathy, the ability to vicariously experience and understand the affect of others, is hypothesized to be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviors, but the link between empathy and prosocial behavior is still unclear. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) participants chose between different stimuli that were probabilistically associated with rewards for themselves (self), another person (prosocial), or no one (control). Using computational modeling, we show that people can learn to obtain rewards for others but do so more slowly than when learning to obtain rewards for themselves. fMRI revealed that activity in a posterior portion of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (sgACC) drives learning only when we are acting in a prosocial context and signals a prosocial prediction error conforming to classical principles of reinforcement learning theory. However, there is also substantial variability in the neural and behavioral efficiency of prosocial learning, which is predicted by trait empathy. More empathic people learn more quickly when benefitting others, and their sgACC response is the most selective for prosocial learning. We thus reveal a computational mechanism driving prosocial learning in humans. This framework could provide insights into atypical prosocial behavior in those with disorders of social cognition.reinforcement learning theory | prosocial behavior | empathy | reward | subgenual anterior cingulate cortex P rosocial behaviors, namely, social behaviors or actions intended to benefit others, are a fundamental but poorly understood aspect of social interaction (1). To behave prosocially, animals need to learn about the consequences that their actions can have for others. In reinforcement learning theory (RLT), prediction errors (PEs)-differences between expected and actual outcomesdrive learning (2). RLT provides a powerful framework for understanding how animals learn to obtain rewards for themselves (3). However, the processes by which animals learn to make choices that benefit others are unknown. Here we use RLT to characterize prosocial learning, combining functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and detailed computational modeling of behavior.Studies using economic games, moral judgments, or charity donation tasks have consistently reported activity in the ventral striatum, posterior regions of the subgenual cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (hereinafter referred to as sgACC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during prosocial behavior (4-7). Each of these regions receives input from midbrain dopaminergic neurons (8), and these cortical regions all project to the ventral ...

Anxiety is characterized by altered responses under uncertain conditions, but the precise mechanism by which uncertainty changes the behaviour of anxious individuals is unclear. Here we probe the computational basis of learning under uncertainty in healthy individuals and individuals with a mix of mood and anxiety disorders. Participants chose between four competing slot machines with fluctuating, reward/punishment outcomes during safety and stress. We predicted that anxious individuals under stress would learn faster about punishments, and exhibit choices that were more affected by them, formalising our predictions as parameters in reinforcement-learning accounts of behaviour. Overall, data suggest that anxious individuals are quicker to update their behaviour in response to negative outcomes (i.e. increased punishment learning-rates). When treating anxiety, it may therefore be more fruitful to encourage anxious individuals to integrate information over longer horizons when bad things happen, rather than try to blunt responses to negative outcomes.

Recently, evidence for endemically low statistical power has cast neuroscience findings into doubt. If low statistical power plagues neuroscience, then this reduces confidence in the reported effects. However, if statistical power is not uniformly low, then such blanket mistrust might not be warranted. Here, we provide a different perspective on this issue, analyzing data from an influential study reporting a median power of 21% across 49 meta-analyses (Button et al., 2013). We demonstrate, using Gaussian mixture modeling, that the sample of 730 studies included in that analysis comprises several subcomponents so the use of a single summary statistic is insufficient to characterize the nature of the distribution. We find that statistical power is extremely low for studies included in meta-analyses that reported a null result and that it varies substantially across subfields of neuroscience, with particularly low power in candidate gene association studies. Therefore, whereas power in neuroscience remains a critical issue, the notion that studies are systematically underpowered is not the full story: low power is far from a universal problem.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Recently, researchers across the biomedical and psychological sciences have become concerned with the reliability of results. One marker for reliability is statistical power: the probability of finding a statistically significant result given that the effect exists. Previous evidence suggests that statistical power is low across the field of neuroscience. Our results present a more comprehensive picture of statistical power in neuroscience: on average, studies are indeed underpowered—some very seriously so—but many studies show acceptable or even exemplary statistical power. We show that this heterogeneity in statistical power is common across most subfields in neuroscience. This new, more nuanced picture of statistical power in neuroscience could affect not only scientific understanding, but potentially policy and funding decisions for neuroscience research.

Computational modelling has been used to address: (1) the variety of symptoms observed in schizophrenia using abstract models of behavior (e.g. Bayesian models - top-down descriptive models of psychopathology); (2) the causes of these symptoms using biologically realistic models involving abnormal neuromodulation and/or receptor imbalance (e.g. connectionist and neural networks - bottom-up realistic models of neural processes). These different levels of analysis have been used to answer different questions (i.e. understanding behavioral vs. neurobiological anomalies) about the nature of the disorder. As such, these computational studies have mostly supported diverging hypotheses of schizophrenia's pathophysiology, resulting in a literature that is not always expanding coherently. Some of these hypotheses are however ripe for revision using novel empirical evidence. Here we present a review that first synthesizes the literature of computational modelling for schizophrenia and psychotic symptoms into categories supporting the dopamine, glutamate, GABA, dysconnection and Bayesian inference hypotheses respectively. Secondly, we compare model predictions against the accumulated empirical evidence and finally we identify specific hypotheses that have been left relatively under-investigated.

Although poor decision-making is a hallmark of psychiatric conditions such as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, pathological gambling or substance abuse, a fraction of healthy individuals exhibit similar poor decision-making performances in everyday life and specific laboratory tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task. These particular individuals may provide information on risk factors or common endophenotypes of these mental disorders. In a rodent version of the Iowa gambling task – the Rat Gambling Task (RGT), we identified a population of poor decision makers, and assessed how these rats scored for several behavioral traits relevant to executive disorders: risk taking, reward seeking, behavioral inflexibility, and several aspects of impulsivity. First, we found that poor decision-making could not be well predicted by single behavioral and cognitive characteristics when considered separately. By contrast, a combination of independent traits in the same individual, namely risk taking, reward seeking, behavioral inflexibility, as well as motor impulsivity, was highly predictive of poor decision-making. Second, using a reinforcement-learning model of the RGT, we confirmed that only the combination of extreme scores on these traits could induce maladaptive decision-making. Third, the model suggested that a combination of these behavioral traits results in an inaccurate representation of rewards and penalties and inefficient learning of the environment. Poor decision-making appears as a consequence of the over-valuation of high-reward-high-risk options in the task. Such a specific psychological profile could greatly impair clinically healthy individuals in decision-making tasks and may predispose to mental disorders with similar symptoms.

The lateral habenula plays a central role in reward and punishment processing and has been suggested to drive the cardinal symptom of anhedonia in depression. This hypothesis is largely based on observations of habenula hypermetabolism in animal models of depression, but the activity of habenula and its relationship with clinical symptoms in patients with depression remains unclear. High-resolution functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modelling were used to investigate the activity of the habenula during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task with rewarding and punishing outcomes in 21 unmedicated patients with major depression and 17 healthy participants. High-resolution anatomical scans were also acquired to assess group differences in habenula volume. Healthy individuals displayed the expected activation in the left habenula during receipt of punishment and this pattern was confirmed in the computational analysis of prediction error processing. In depressed patients, there was a trend towards attenuated left habenula activation to punishment, while greater left habenula activation was associated with more severe depressive symptoms and anhedonia. We also identified greater habenula volume in patients with depression, which was associated with anhedonic symptoms. Habenula dysfunction may contribute to abnormal response to punishment in patients with depression, and symptoms such as anhedonia.

Nonlinear Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) for fMRI provides computational modelling of gating mechanisms at the neuronal population level. It allows for estimations of connection strengths with nonlinear modulation within task-dependent networks. This paper presents an application of nonlinear DCM in subjects at high familial risk of schizophrenia performing the Hayling Sentence Completion Task (HSCT). We analysed scans of 19 healthy controls and 46 subjects at high familial risk of schizophrenia, which included 26 high risk subjects without psychotic symptoms and 20 subjects with psychotic symptoms. The activity-dependent network consists of the intra parietal cortex (IPS), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle temporal gyrus (MTG), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the mediodorsal (MD) thalamus. The connections between the MD thalamus and the IFG were gated by the MD thalamus. We used DCM to investigate altered connection strength of these connections. Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) at the group and family level was used to compare the optimal bilinear and nonlinear models. Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) was used to assess the connection strengths with the gating from the MD thalamus and the IFG. The nonlinear models provided the better explanation of the data. Furthermore, the BMA analysis showed significantly lower connection strength of the thalamocortical connection with nonlinear modulation from the MD thalamus in high risk subjects with psychotic symptoms and those who subsequently developed schizophrenia. These findings demonstrate that nonlinear DCM provides a method to investigate altered connectivity at the level of neural circuits. The reduced connection strength with thalamic gating may be a neurobiomarker implicated in the development of psychotic symptoms. This study suggests that nonlinear DCM could lead to new insights into functional and effective dysconnection at the network level in subjects at high familial risk.

Prominent theories suggest that symptoms of schizophrenia stem from learning deficiencies resulting in distorted internal models of the world. To test these theories further, we used a visual statistical learning task known to induce rapid implicit learning of the stimulus statistics. In this task, participants are presented with a field of coherently moving dots and are asked to report the presented direction of the dots (estimation task), and whether they saw any dots or not (detection task). Two of the directions were more frequently presented than the others. In controls, the implicit acquisition of the stimuli statistics influences their perception in two ways: (i) motion directions are perceived as being more similar to the most frequently presented directions than they really are (estimation biases); and (ii) in the absence of stimuli, participants sometimes report perceiving the most frequently presented directions (a form of hallucinations). Such behaviour is consistent with probabilistic inference, i.e. combining learnt perceptual priors with sensory evidence. We investigated whether patients with chronic, stable, treated schizophrenia (n = 20) differ from controls (n = 23) in the acquisition of the perceptual priors and/or their influence on perception. We found that although patients were slower than controls, they showed comparable acquisition of perceptual priors, approximating the stimulus statistics. This suggests that patients have no statistical learning deficits in our task. This may reflect our patients’ relative wellbeing on antipsychotic medication. Intriguingly, however, patients experienced significantly fewer (P = 0.016) hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions than controls when the stimulus was absent or when it was very weak (prior-based lapse estimations). This suggests that prior expectations had less influence on patients’ perception than on controls when stimuli were absent or below perceptual threshold.