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Once considered potential sources of danger, generating industrial risks, companies are now viewed as indispensable partners in preparing risk responses. However, this shift raises the crucial question of the coordination between the various actors, especially as the literature -particularly on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and inter-organisational collaborations -highlights multiple potential obstacles. This article analyses the conditions and difficulties of this type of collaboration in preparing the response to a major collective risk -the threat of an influenza pandemic -by examining the relations between French public authorities and companies before and during the alert raised by an outbreak of A(H1N1). Shaped by responsibility and legitimacy issues, these relations are problematic and ambiguous, revealing a poorly designed framework which seems to be a source of difficulties rather than conducive to the effective handling of a pandemic threat. Ultimately, the study questions the desirability of a PPP in the specific context of risk management. This study is based on 30 interviews with public and private-sector actors together with the observation of conferences and the meetings of groups that exchange good practices between companies.

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La théorie du sensemaking de K.E. Weick est une des approches les plus fécondes pour rendre compte des réactions des organisations aux situations de crise. Or cette théorie ne concède à la décision qu'une place restreinte par rapport à l'importance que les acteurs confèrent aux pratiques décisionnelles dans les organisations. Cet article 1 propose d'envisager la décision comme un support du processus de sensemaking. Une conception tridimensionnelle de la décision est développée pour analyser la dynamique, positive ou négative, qui lie sensemaking et décision. Ces propositions s'appuient sur une étude de cas portant sur la réaction d'un groupe d'acteurs confrontés à la concrétisation d'une menace pressentie : la pandémie grippale de 2009.

It was reclaimed loud and clear. In March 2020, it became a symbol of our efforts to protect those on the front lines. From April, it has become the companion for our outings. It has been displayed as the mark that our regions/cities/employers protect us. The mask has established itself as a central artefact in this uncertain era, where we must live with coronavirus. This central role was not, however, self-evident. Much has been written about how the French State, having in stocks 1 billion surgical masks and 285 million FFP2 in 2009, let the country 'disarm'. Comments highlight the accounting logic at work (Mercier 2020), the pandemic fatigue 2 after the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic alert, the illusion of control which followed (Davet and Lhomme 2020). In 2008, I studied why and how French companies were preparing for a possible influenza pandemic. We were after human A(H5N1) cases in China, before the A(H1N1) outbreak. My exploratory study included 15 interviews with civil servants belonging to the inter-ministerial delegate for the fight against pandemic flu's (DILGA) team, Prime Minister's services, Ministries, a Defense and Security Zone 3 , as well as business continuity managers (BCM) in charge of preparing their companies, some of them being operators of 'vital importance' 4 , and risk consultants. When I recently read this old research work, one element struck me: back then, many questioned the choice of massive purchases of masks. Far from the image of an absolute weapon that has retrospectively built up in our minds, this equipment was by no means obvious. How could it prevail? What were masks (really) for? Examining how masks emerge as central for public decision-makers preparing for a pandemic in 2004-2005, this commentary aims at understanding how driving forces underlying this decision-making may have contributed to the post-A(H1N1) disarmament and explain the French government's volte-face in 2020. An imperfect solution In 2008, the French State was almost alone among Western governments to push companies to acquire masks. The issue was vividly debated among large companies' BCM, who challenged their ministerial interlocutors. It was indeed far from being a 'miraculous' equipment: it did not filter everything, even FFP2; it had to be worn with glasses and be included in a set of practices (handwashing, social distancing). Mostly, it caused discomfort, fogging glasses, skin irritation, breathing difficulties in case of physical effort, etc.

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