To optimize the energy consumption and performance of their CPUs, AMD introduced a way predictor for the L1-data (L1D) cache to predict in which cache way a certain address is located. Consequently, only this way is accessed, significantly reducing the power consumption of the processor. In this paper, we are the first to exploit the cache way predictor. We reverse-engineered AMD's L1D cache way predictor in microarchitectures from 2011 to 2019, resulting in two new attack techniques. With Collide+Probe, an attacker can monitor a victim's memory accesses without knowledge of physical addresses or shared memory when time-sharing a logical core. With Load+ Reload, we exploit the way predictor to obtain highly-accurate memory-access traces of victims on the same physical core. While Load+Reload relies on shared memory, it does not invalidate the cache line, allowing stealthier attacks that do not induce any lastlevel-cache evictions. We evaluate our new side channel in different attack scenarios. We demonstrate a covert channel with up to 588.9 kB/s, which we also use in a Spectre attack to exfiltrate secret data from the kernel. Furthermore, we present a key-recovery attack from a vulnerable cryptographic implementation. We also show an entropy-reducing attack on ASLR of the kernel of a fully patched Linux system, the hypervisor, and our own address space from JavaScript. Finally, we propose countermeasures in software and hardware mitigating the presented attacks. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures; Operating systems security.

In recent years, expansion-based techniques have been shown to be very powerful in theory and practice for solving quantified Boolean formulas (QBF), the extension of propositional formulas with existential and universal quantifiers over Boolean variables. Such approaches partially expand one type of variable (either existential or universal) and pass the obtained formula to a SAT solver for deciding the QBF. State-of-the-art expansionbased solvers process the given formula quantifier-block wise and recursively apply expansion until a solution is found.In this paper, we present a novel algorithm for expansionbased QBF solving that deals with the whole quantifier prefix at once. Hence recursive applications of the expansion principle are avoided. Experiments indicate that the performance of our simple approach is comparable with the state of the art of QBF solving, especially in combination with other solving techniques.

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In recent years, expansion-based techniques have been shown to be very powerful in theory and practice for solving quantified Boolean formulas (QBF), the extension of propositional formulas with existential and universal quantifiers over Boolean variables. Such approaches partially expand one type of variable (either existential or universal) for obtaining a propositional abstraction of the QBF. If this formula is false, the truth value of the QBF is decided, otherwise further refinement steps are necessary. Classically, expansion-based solvers process the given formula quantifier-block wise and use one SAT solver per quantifier block. In this paper, we present a novel algorithm for expansion-based QBF solving that deals with the whole quantifier prefix at once. Hence recursive applications of the expansion principle are avoided and only two incremental SAT solvers are required. While our algorithm is naturally based on the $$\forall $$ ∀ Exp+Res calculus that is the formal foundation of expansion-based solving, it is conceptually simpler than present recursive approaches. Experiments indicate that the performance of our simple approach is comparable with the state of the art of QBF solving, especially in combination with other solving techniques.

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Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks pose a considerable threat to cryptographic devices that are physically accessible by an attacker. As a consequence, devices like smart cards implement corresponding countermeasures like redundant computation and masking. Recently, statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA) have been shown to be able to circumvent these classical countermeasure techniques. We present a new approach for verifying the SIFA protection of arbitrary masked implementations in both hardware and software. The proposed method uses Boolean dependency analysis, factorization, and known properties of masked computations to show whether the fault detection mechanism of redundant masked circuits can leak information about the processed secret values. We implemented this new method in a tool called Danira, which can show the SIFA resistance of cryptographic implementations like AES S-Boxes within minutes.

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