Two experiments, one conducted with American college students and one with Israeli pilots and their instructors, explored the predictive power of reputation-based assessments versus the stated "name of the game" (Wall Street Game vs. Community Game) in determining players' responses in an N-move Prisoner's Dilemma. The results of these studies showed that the relevant labeling manipulations exerted far greater impact on the players' choice to cooperate versus defect--both in the first round and overall--than anticipated by the individuals who had predicted their behavior. Reputation-based prediction, by contrast, failed to discriminate cooperators from defectors. A supplementary questionnaire study showed the generality of the relevant short-coming in naïve psychology. The implications of these findings, and the potential contribution of the present methodology to the classic pedagogical strategy of the demonstration experiment, are discussed.

Three studies, 2 conducted in Israel and 1 conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrated that affirming a positive aspect of the self can increase one's willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for wrongdoing against others, express feelings of group-based guilt, and consequently provide greater support for reparation policies. By contrast, affirming one's group, although similarly boosting feelings of pride, failed to increase willingness to acknowledge and redress in-group wrongdoing. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the mediating role of group-based guilt. That is, increased acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for out-group victimization produced increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increased support for reparation policies to the victimized group. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.

The overconfidence observed in calibration studies Who will win the election, the incumbent or the chalhas recently been questioned on both psychological lenger?). For each question, subjects select one of the and methodological grounds. In the first part of the two answers and assess the probability that their anarticle we discuss these issues and argue that overconswer is correct. A judge is said to be calibrated if his fidence cannot be explained as a selection bias, and or her probability judgments match the corresponding that it is not eliminated by random sampling of quesrelative frequency of occurrence. Specifically, among all tions. In the second part of the article, we compare answers to which the judge assigns a given probability probability judgments for single events with judg-(say, 75%), the judge is calibrated if 75% of these anments of relative frequency. Subjects received a target swers are in fact correct. individual's personality profile and then predicted the target's responses to a series of binary questions. One METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The goal of the current project is to integrate psychological research on emotion regulation with the study of democratic practices in general and political intolerance in particular. We hypothesized that the use of a well-established emotion regulation strategy, cognitive reappraisal, would be associated with lower levels of group-based negative emotions toward one’s least-liked group and lower levels of political intolerance toward that group. Preliminary data based on nationwide survey conducted among Jews in Israel show that the tendency to reappraise negative emotions during war is associated with more tolerant attitudes. In studies 1 and 2, we experimentally manipulated reappraisal, and this led to reduced levels of political intolerance toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel (study 1) and toward one’s least-liked group (study 2). These effects were transmitted via a decrease in negative emotions in both studies, as well as by an increase in support for general democratic values in Study 2.

Judgments of probability are commonly evaluated by two criteria: calibration, namely, the correspondence between stated confidence and rate of occurrence, and resolution, namely, the ability to distinguish between events that do and do not occur. Two representations of probability judgments are contrasted: the designated form that presupposes a particular coding of outcomes (e.g., rain vs. no rain) and the inclusive form that incorporates all events and their complements. It is shown that the indices of calibration and resolution derived from these representations measure different characteristics of judgment. Calibration is distinguished from two types of overconfidence: specific and generic. An ordinal measure of performance is proposed and compared to the standard measures in forecasts of recession and in both numerical and verbal assessments of general knowledge.Much research on judgment under uncertainty has focused on the comparison of probability judgments with the corresponding relative frequency of occurrence. In a typical study, judges are presented with a series of prediction or knowledge problems and asked to assess the probability of the events in question. Judgments of probability or confidence are used both in research (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982;Wallsten & Budescu, 1983) and in practice. For example, weather forecasters often report the probability of rain (Murphy & Daan, 1985), and economists are sometimes called upon to estimate the chances of recession (Zarnowitz & Lambros, 1987).The two main criteria used to evaluate such judgments are calibration and resolution. A judge is said to be calibrated if his or her probability judgments match the corresponding relative frequency of occurrence. More specifically, consider all events to which the judge assigns a probability p; the judge is calibrated if the proportion of events in that class that actually occur equals p. Calibration is a desirable property, especially for communication, but it does not ensure informativeness. A judge can be properly calibrated and entirely noninformative if, for example, he or she predicts the sex of each newborn with