Abstract-In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.
Abstract-In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.
The complex problem of network cost allocation prompts the development of stable network usage evaluation models that can handle the new market situations involving multiple players. Under the restructured environment, the embedded cost needs to be allocated to the loads as well as generators so as to provide a locational signal to both types of customers for optimal location. This article proposes gametheoretic models based on the Nucleolus and Shapley value approaches for cost allocation problems under the restructured environment. The obtained results are compared with those from the usually adopted methodologies to assert easy implementation of the proposed methodologies.
The thrust on renewable power generation is enthusing a large number of distributed generators to join the distribution system at varied locations. With multiple players in the emerging restructured market, regulators require a robust model for the complex problem of network cost allocation. In such an environment, Cooperative Game Theory provides a stable cost allocation model for network usage to handle the new market situations. The paper provides a game theoretic model that allocates the cost of DG embedded distribution network based on Nucleolus and Shapley Value approaches. Consistent results obtained for distribution networks qualify the application of game theoretic approaches. Comparisons with the results from MW-Mile model assert their relevance and easy implementation.
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