Age differences in emotional experience over the adult life span were explored, focusing on the frequency, intensity, complexity, and consistency of emotional experience in everyday life. One hundred eighty-four people, age 18 to 94 years, participated in an experience-sampling procedure in which emotions were recorded across a 1-week period. Age was unrelated to frequency of positive emotional experience. A curvilinear relationship best characterized negative emotional experience. Negative emotions declined in frequency until approximately age 60, at which point the decline ceased. Individual factor analyses computed for each participant revealed that age was associated with more differentiated emotional experience. In addition, periods of highly positive emotional experience were more likely to endure among older people and periods of highly negative emotional experience were less stable. Findings are interpreted within the theoretical framework of socioemotional selectivity theory.

Flexible control of action requires the ability to disengage from previous goals or task sets. The authors tested the hypothesis that disengagement during intentional shifts between task sets is accompanied by inhibition of the previous task set ("backward inhibition"). As an expression of backward inhibition the authors predicted increased response times when shifting to a task set that had to be abandoned recently and, thus, suffers residual inhibition. The critical backward inhibition effect on the level of abstractly defined perceptual task sets was obtained across 6 different experiments. In addition, it was shown that backward inhibition can be differentiated from negative priming (Experiment 2), that it is tied to top-down sequential control (Experiment 3), that it can account at least partially for "residual shift costs" in set-shifting experiments (Experiment 4), and that it occurs even in the context of preplanned sequences of task sets (Experiment 5). Our natural environment is relatively unconstrained with respect to the number of possible actions that could be pursued at any given moment. For example, in many work settings a multitude of different tasks need to be performed. Overall success depends to a large degree on the ability to finish off one task while resisting the tendency to jump to another one for no other reason than its presence in the "field of view." Thus, the ambiguity of external context with respect to action selection needs to be countered by strong and stable internal representations that are often referred to as "task sets" and that constrain the space of possible actions (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The importance of such internal representations for normal behavior is clearly apparent in those cases where they seem to be missing. For example, some patients with frontal-lobe damage may show actions (e.g., tooth-brushing) that are triggered by related objects (e.g., a toothbrush) irrespective of current goals (e.g,, Lhermitte, 1983). Goal-related representations that are stable enough to direct behavior even in the face of opposing action tendencies certainly are one of the hallmarks of primate, and in particular of human, thinking and action. They also clearly belong to one of the least understood aspects of higher cognition (e.g., Monsell, 1996).

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Civil societies function because people pay taxes and make charitable contributions to provide public goods. One possible motive for charitable contributions, called "pure altruism," is satisfied by increases in the public good no matter the source or intent. Another possible motive, "warm glow," is only fulfilled by an individual's own voluntary donations. Consistent with pure altruism, we find that even mandatory, tax-like transfers to a charity elicit neural activity in areas linked to reward processing. Moreover, neural responses to the charity's financial gains predict voluntary giving. However, consistent with warm glow, neural activity further increases when people make transfers voluntarily. Both pure altruism and warm-glow motives appear to determine the hedonic consequences of financial transfers to the public good.

A task-switching paradigm with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks was used to separate cue-switching processes (indexed through pure cue-switch costs) from actual task-switching processes (indexed through additional costs in case of cue and task changes). A large portion of total switch costs was due to cue changes (Experiments 1 and 2), and cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs were sensitive to effects of practice (Experiment 1) and preparation (Experiment 2). In contrast, task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) and task-set inhibition (Experiment 3). Results suggest two processing stages relevant during task-set selection: cue-driven retrieval of task rules from long-term memory and the automatic application of rules to a particular stimulus situation.

The authors tested the hypothesis of a close relationship between the intentional component of task-set switching ("advance reconfignration;" R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995) and long-term memory (LTM) retrieval. Consistent with this hypothesis, switch costs are reported to be larger when the switched-to task involves high retrieval demands (i.e., retrieval of episodic information) than when it involves low retrieval demands (i.e., retrieval of semantic information). In contrast, switch costs were not affected by a primary-task difficulty manipulation unrelated to intentional retrieval demands (Experiment 2). Also, the retrieval-demand effect on switch costs was eliminated when time for advanced preparation or task cues explicitly specifying the task rules were provided (Experiment 3). Overall, results were consistent with the hypothesis that the intentional switch-cost component reflects the time demands of retrieving appropriate task rules from LTM.Because environment usually allows multiple paths of action, internal control settings are needed to specify the currently desired action. However, most people occasionally experience situations where internal settings are not strong enough to withstand the force of external triggers and, as a result, one may perform the wrong action. Extreme cases of such breakdown of internal settings produce symptoms associated with frontaMobe pathology, such as capture behavior, whereby environmental stimuli trigger associated actions whether or not the context is appropriate (e.g., Lhermitte, 1983). Knowledge about how internal control settings are established, maintained, and deactivated should be the key to a better understanding of complex, organized action in the range of normal functioning as well as its breakdown in pathological cases.In the cognitive literature, internal control settings are subsumed under the label task sets (e.g

Switching between tasks leads to response-time (RT) costs at switch points (local switch costs) and often to RT costs at no-switch transitions that occur in the context of a task-switching block (global set-selection costs). With trial-to-trial cuing of tasks, moderate age effects were obtained for local switch costs, but large age effects were obtained for global selection costs. In Experiment 1, set-specific inhibition was found to be at least as large in old as in young adults, thus ruling out an inhibition deficit as a reason for age differences in global costs. In Experiment 2, large age differences in global costs were limited to conditions of ambiguous stimuli and full response-set overlap. This pattern of results suggests a greater reliance on set-updating processes in old than in young adults. The role of these processes is to ensure unambiguos internal control settings when ambiguity arises from stimuli and response specifications.

The authors theorize that 2 neurocognitive sequence-learning systems can be distinguished in serial reaction time experiments, one dorsal (parietal and supplementary motor cortex) and the other ventral (temporal and lateral prefrontal cortex). Dorsal system learning is implicit and associates noncategorized stimuli within dimensional modules. Ventral system learning can be implicit or explicit It also allows associating events across dimensions and therefore is the basis of cross-task integration or interference, depending on degree of cross-task correlation of signals. Accordingly, lack of correlation rather than limited capacity is responsible for dual-task effects on learning. The theory is relevant to issues of attentional effects on learning; the representational basis of complex, sequential skills; hippocampal-versus basal ganglia-based learning; procedural versus declarative memory; and implicit versus explicit memory.