Background The success of antiretroviral therapy (ART) has led to dramatic changes in causes of morbidity and mortality in HIV-infected individuals. As chronic diseases rates have increased in HIV+ populations, modifiable risk factors such as obesity have increased in importance. Our objective was to evaluate factors associated with weight change among patients receiving ART. Methods ART-naïve patients initiating therapy at the University of Alabama - Birmingham 1917 HIV/AIDS Clinic from 2000– 2008 were included. Body Mass Index (BMI) was categorized as: underweight (<18.5), normal weight (18.5–24.9), overweight (25–29.9) and obese (≥30). Linear regression models were used to evaluate overall change in BMI and factors associated with increased BMI category 24 months following ART initiation. Results Among 681 patients, the mean baseline BMI was 25.4 ± 6.1; 44% of patients were overweight/obese. At 24 months, 20% of patients moved from normal to overweight/obese or overweight to obese BMI categories. Greater increases in BMI were observed in patients with baseline CD4 count < 50 cells/μl (3.4 ± 4.1, P<0.01) and boosted protease inhibitor use (2.5±4.1 P=0.01), but did not account for all of the variation observed in weight change. Conclusions The findings that almost half of patients were overweight or obese at ART initiation, and 1 in 5 patients moved to a deleterious BMI category within 2 years of ART initiation are alarming. ART therapy provides only a modest contribution to weight gain in patients. Obesity represents a highly prevalent condition in patients with HIV infection and an important target for intervention.

AYA self-identities evolve during the illness experience. When words such as "religion" and "spirituality" do not fit, explicitly exploring hopes, worries, meaning, and changing life perspectives may be a promising alternative.

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In this article, our analysis of empathy in the clinical context hinges on the complexities of patients who are acutely suffering. Using a case concerning a heart transplant patient with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, Alex, and his nurse, Joe, we investigate how empathy’s phenomenological nebulousness can generate doubts about its virtue. Even when asking, “How are you, Alex?” Joe hates the question; it seems empty, silly. Cases like this show both that the enactment of empathy is sometimes challenging and that it can be reasonable to wonder if empathy is a virtue at all. Perhaps Alex’s suffering is simply too massive: Joe cannot possibly know how he feels, so why try? Perhaps empathy would only cause Joe to suffer along with Alex. Not only is empathy difficult to produce in the context of Alex’s suffering; it may not even be possible; and if we simply cannot muster empathy, what is the point of morally demanding it? In response, we distinguish different kinds of empathic engagements from one another and offer separate counsel. We argue that it is important to understand empathy as something that must be honed across varied contexts before it can be called a virtue. Conceptualizing and operationalizing empathy in this way helps to ground its possibility and virtue even in the most challenging and complex clinical encounters.

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The alleviation of suffering has always been central to the care of the sick. Yet as medical technology has advanced and life-sustaining treatments multiplied, medicine's capacity to both prevent and create suffering has grown exponentially. In pediatric medicine, the ability to stave off death with life-sustaining treatments allows children to survive but also to suffer in ways that are diverse and unprecedented. However, although parents and pediatric clinicians broadly agree that all children can suffer, there is little published literature in which researchers analyze or clarify the concept of pediatric suffering. This gap is worrisome, especially in light of growing concerns that the label of suffering is used to justify end-of-life decision-making and mask quality-of-life determinations for pediatric patients with profound neurologic impairment. Moreover, the awareness that some children can experience suffering but cannot communicate whether and how they are suffering creates a problem. Does the determination of suffering in a nonverbal child lie in the judgement of clinicians or parents? In this article, I will address several important questions related to the suffering of children through an analysis of two prevalent conceptualizations of pediatric suffering and suggest a possible avenue forward for future scholarship.

There are two widespread beliefs about the use of metaphors in clinical medicine. The first is that military metaphors are harmful to patients and should be discouraged in medical practice. The second is that the metaphors of clinical practice can be judged by and standardized in reference to neutral criteria. In this article, I evaluate both these beliefs, exposing their shared flawed logic. This logic underwrites the false empiricist assumptions that metaphorical language and literal language are fundamentally distinct, play separate roles in communication, and therefore can be independently analyzed, systematized, and prescribed. Next, using the resources of ordinary language philosophy, I lay out a theoretical view of medical metaphors that is grounded in metaphor use within clinician‐patient relationships. Finally, drawing on the work of philosopher Max Black, I diagram a practical conceptual framework for clinicians to use when they consider whether a metaphor is appropriate for a specific patient encounter.