for a Task Force of the Association of Bioethics Program Directors* Background: The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has or threatens to overwhelm health care systems. Many institutions are developing ventilator triage policies.

We analyzed 40 cases of falsification, fabrication, or plagiarism (FFP), comparing them to other types of wrongdoing in research (n = 40) and medicine (n = 40). Fifty-one variables were coded from an average of 29 news or investigative reports per case. Financial incentives, oversight failures, and seniority correlate significantly with more serious instances of FFP. However, most environmental variables were nearly absent from cases of FFP and none were more strongly present in cases of FFP than in other types of wrongdoing. Qualitative data suggest FFP involves thinking errors, poor coping with research pressures, and inadequate oversight. We offer recommendations for education, institutional investigations, policy, and further research.

In this paper we describe our approach to understanding wrongdoing in medical research and practice, which involves the statistical analysis of coded data from a large set of published cases. We focus on understanding the environmental factors that predict the kind and the severity of wrongdoing in medicine. Through review of empirical and theoretical literature, consultation with experts, the application of criminological theory, and ongoing analysis of our first 60 cases, we hypothesize that 10 contextual features of the medical environment (including financial rewards, oversight failures, and patients belonging to vulnerable groups) may contribute to professional wrongdoing. We define each variable, examine data supporting our hypothesis, and present a brief case synopsis from our study that illustrates the potential influence of the variable. Finally, we discuss limitations of the resulting framework and directions for future research.

Despite the lack of evidence for their effectiveness, the use of physical restraints for patients is widespread. The best ethical justification for restraining patients is that it prevents them from harming themselves. We argue that even if the empirical evidence supported their effectiveness in achieving this aim, their use would nevertheless be unethical, so long as well known exceptions to informed consent fail to apply. Specifically, we argue that ethically justifiable restraint use demands certain necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are that the physician obtain informed consent for their application, that their application be medically appropriate, and that restraints be the least liberty-restricting way of achieving the intended benefit. It is a further question whether their application is ever medically appropriate, given the dearth of evidence for their effectiveness.