BackgroundIn primary care, financial incentives have usually been directed to physicians because they are thought to make the key decisions in order to change the functions of a medical organization. There are no studies regarding the impact that directing these incentives to all disciplines of the care team (e.g. group bonuses for both nurses and doctors) may have, despite the low frequency with which diagnoses were being recorded for primary care visits to doctors. This study tested the effect of offering group bonuses to the care teams.MethodsThis was a retrospective quasi-experimental study with before-and-after settings and two control groups. In the intervention group, the mean percentage of visits to a doctor for which a diagnosis was recorded by each individual care team (mean team-based percentage of monthly visits to a doctor with recorded diagnoses) and simultaneously the same data was gathered from two different primary care settings where no team bonuses were applied. To study the sustainability of changes obtained with the group bonuses the respective data were derived from the electronic health record system for 2 years after the cessation of the intervention. The differences in the rate of marking diagnoses was analyzed with ANOVA and RM-ANOVA with appropriate post hoc tests, and the differences in the rate of change in marking diagnoses was analyzed with linear regression followed by t-test.ResultsThe proportion of doctor visits having recorded diagnoses in the teams was about 55 % before starting to use group bonuses and 90 % after this intervention. There was no such increase in control units. The effect of the intervention weakened slightly after cessation of the group bonuses.ConclusionGroup bonuses may provide a method to alter clinical practices in primary care. However, sustainability of these interventions may diminish after ceasing this type of financial incentive.

Introduction We studied whether primary care teams respond to financial group bonuses by improving the recording of diagnoses, whether this intervention leads to diagnoses reflecting the anticipated distribution of diseases, and how the recording of a significant chronic disease, diabetes, alters after the application of these bonuses. Methods We performed an observational register-based retrospective quasi-experimental follow-up study with before-and-after setting and two control groups in primary healthcare of a Finnish town. We studied the rate of recorded diagnoses in visits to general practitioners with interrupted time series analysis. The distribution of these diagnoses was also recorded. Results After group bonuses, the rate of recording diagnoses increased by 17.9% (95% CI: 13.6–22.3) but not in either of the controls (−2.0 to −0.3%). The increase in the rate of recorded diagnoses in the care teams varied between 14.9% (4.7–25.2) and 33.7% (26.6–41.3). The distribution of recorded diagnoses resembled the respective distribution of diagnoses in the former studies of diagnoses made in primary care. The rate of recorded diagnoses of diabetes did not increase just after the intervention. Conclusions In primary care, the completeness of diagnosis recording can be, to varying degrees, influenced by group bonuses without guarantee that recording of clinically significant chronic diseases is improved.

ObjectiveTo improve the recording of diagnoses in visits to general practitioners, an observational retrospective study based on a before-after design was performed by installing an electronic reminder in the computerized patient chart system, reinforced in feedback delivered in superior-subordinate or development discussions with the general practitioners. The monthly rate of recording diagnoses was observed before and after the intervention. The effect of this intervention on recording of diagnoses was compared with the effects of financial group bonuses on the same parameter in a neighbouring city.ResultsBefore intervention, the level of recording diagnoses was about 45% in the primary care units. Nine months after this intervention there was not yet any statistically significant increase in recording of diagnoses but after 21 months it yielded a recording rate of 90% (P < 0.001). In three years, this percentage reached level over 95%. Group bonuses, a financial incentive serving as a control intervention, increased this parameter from 50 to 80% (P < 0.001) in nine months, and in 21 months the level of recording diagnoses was 90%. The both methods increased the level of recording diagnoses at the same level. Group bonuses acted faster but were also more expensive.

Objectives: This study examined whether using electronic reminders leads to an increase in the rate of diagnosis recordings in the electronic health record system following visits to a general practitioner. The impact of electronic reminders was studied in the primary health care of a Finnish city. Methods: This observational quasi-experimental study based on a before-and-after design was carried out by installing an electronic reminder to improve the recording of diagnoses in the computerized electronic health record system. The quantity of the recorded diagnoses was observed before and after the intervention. The effect of this intervention on the distribution of different diagnoses was also studied. Results: Before intervention, 33%–46% of visits (to general practitioners/month) had recorded diagnose in the primary health care units. After 4 years, the recording rate had risen to 87%–95% (p < 0.001). The rate of change in the recording of diagnoses was highest during the first year of intervention and plateaued about 3.5 years after application reminders. In the present study, most of the visits concerned mild respiratory infections, elevated blood pressure, low back pain and type 2 diabetes. Conclusion: An electronic reminder is likely to improve the recording of diagnoses during the visits to general practitioners. The distribution of diagnoses was in line with former reports concerning diagnoses in Finnish primary care.

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether competition is an effective method to remind primary oral health care dentists to record diagnoses (RRD). The effectiveness of competition was examined in comparison with financial group bonuses (FGBs) and electronic reminders (ERs) of the electronic health record, together with superior-subordinate or development discussions. Putative differences in the diagnosis recording cultures of Finnish public health care physicians and dentists were studied. This was a retrospective quasi-experimental observational study in which the effects of the interventions on the rate of recording diagnoses were identified using a general linear regression model and proportions of visits with recorded diagnoses. The rate of increase in the recording of diagnoses in dentists was 0.995 ± 0.273%/month (mean ± SEM) after the implementation of RRDs and this did not differ from that obtained after starting FGBs (0.919 ± 0.130%/month) or ERs with superior-subordinate or development discussions (1.562 ± 0.277%/month) in physicians. As the rates of increase did not differ none of the applied methods seemed to be more effective than the others when trying to influence the behaviour of primary health care clinicians. Altogether, public primary health care physicians were more active than respective primary oral health care dentists to record diagnoses.