We consider situations of multiple referendum: finitely many yes-or-no issues have to be socially assessed from a set of approval ballots, where voters approve as many issues as they want. Each approval ballot is extended to a complete preorder over the set of outcomes by means of a preference extension. We characterize, under a mild richness condition, the largest domain of top-consistent and separable preference extensions for which issue-wise majority voting is Pareto efficient, i.e., always yields out a Pareto-optimal outcome. Top-consistency means that voters' ballots are their unique most preferred outcome. It appears that the size of this domain becomes negligible relative to the size of the full domain as the number of issues increases.
Interaction, the act of mutual influence, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. This paper presents an individual decision procedure for interacting individuals. According to our model, individuals seek influence from each other for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choicetheoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid us to detect interacting individuals. Revealed preference analysis not only grants underlying preferences, but also the influence acquired.Keywords. Interaction, social influence, boundedly rational decision making, two-stage maximization, incomplete preferences.Individuals who share the same environment, such as members of the same household, friends from school, or colleagues from the workplace, influence each others' behavior through different means of interaction such as advice, inspiration, and imitation. There is an immense economics literature documenting and analyzing the effect of social interactions on individual decisions. 1 However, not enough attention has been paid to the particular decision procedures individuals administer to interact, leaving the microfoundations of social interactions rather unexplored. 2 Addressing this gap, the current paper presents and studies a particular individual decision procedure for interacting agents.Choice on mutual influence (CMI) works as follows: Consider two individuals who are endowed with transitive but not necessarily complete preferences. Facing a decision Tugce Cuhadaroglu: tc48@st-andrews.ac.uk Evans et al. 1992, Bramoullé et al. 2009), and in crime (Glaeser et al. 1996, to name a few. 2 The extensive survey of Blume et al. (2010) on social interactions concludes: "A final area that warrants far more research is the micro-foundations of social interactions. In the econometrics literature, contextual and endogenous social interactions are defined in terms of types of variables rather than via particular mechanisms. This can delimit the utility of the models we have, for example, if the particular mechanisms have different policy implications."
In the context of stochastic choice, we introduce an individual decision model which admits a cardinal notion of peer influence. The model presumes that individual choice is not only determined by idiosyncratic evaluations of alternatives but also by the influence from the observed behavior of others. We establish that the equilibrium defined by the model is unique, stable and falsifiable. Moreover the underlying preference and influence parameters as well as the structure of the underlying network are uniquely identified from, arguably, limited data. The baseline model includes two individuals with conformity motives. Generalizations to multi-individual settings and negative interactions are also introduced and analyzed.
We explore the inequality measurement of a discrete ordinal variable between social groups. We provide an axiomatic characterization for the Net Difference Index (Lieberson: Sociol. Methodol. 7, 276–291 1976), that makes use of rank-domination to evaluate the discrepancy between the distributions of two social groups over ordered categories. Adapting well-known principles of cardinal inequality measurement to the between-group ordinal inequality setting, we show that the Net Difference Index mimics the Gini Index in terms of its relationship to the Lorenz curve, in our setting.
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