We argue that firms located close to one another tend to have similar corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies, due to investor clienteles, local competition, as well as social interactions. Our results are consistent with this notion. In particular, firms located in the same 3-digit zip code exhibit a similar degree of CSR. Exploiting the variation in CSR across zip codes, we estimate the effect of CSR on firm value. Part of the firm's CSR is induced by the surrounding firms in the same zip code and can be considered exogenous as it is determined outside the firm. Because zip code allocation is based on efficiency in mail delivery, and not on corporate policies or outcomes, it is likely exogenous. Our instrumental variable analysis reveals that more socially responsible firms enjoy significantly higher firm value. We confirm the results using phone number area codes, instead of zip codes, and reach the same conclusion.
Key employee life insurance in the banking industry is called bank‐owned life insurance (BOLI). Banks use BOLI to provide financial support to help reduce disruptions due to the death of a key executive and as a part of the executive compensation package. We investigate the characteristics of banks related to the amount of BOLI purchased. We find that BOLI purchases are positively related to bank size and leverage and negatively related to tax rates and employee salaries. We also find that BOLI purchases are related to bank ownership structure and profitability.
The Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) has evolved into a major source of liquidity for the banking system with the demonstrated ability to borrow over a trillion dollars in world financial markets based on an implied U. S. Treasury guarantee. The FHLB loans the borrowed funds to commercial banks at reduced rates that are not adjusted for the risk of an individual bank. Moral hazard could cause member banks using FHLB loans to increase financial leverage and exposure to high risk assets. Conversely, the FHLB offers banks additional liquidity and specialized debt instruments that help them manage interest rate risk. We use dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimation to test the relation between FHLB advances and bank risk. We find that if banks have relatively normal default probabilities, advances are not associated with increased bank risk but, instead, advances are related to decreased interest rate risk. However, when bank default probabilities are high, our evidence suggests advances and higher bank risk are related.
The use of bank‐owned life insurance (BOLI) has more than tripled since 2001 and has caught the attention of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. I find increases in BOLI lead to higher levels of liquidity risk, credit risk, and interest rate risk. Robustness tests confirm these results and suggest over‐ and underinvestment in BOLI and use of BOLI as a tax shelter contribute to risk increases. Results indicate that the concerns expressed by regulators are warranted, and suggest insurance may not always have the intended effect of reducing firm risk because of unintended consequences or misuse.
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