This paper is a contribution to the theoretical foundations of strategies. We first present a general definition of abstract strategies which is extensional in the sense that a strategy is defined explicitly as a set of derivations of an abstract reduction system. We then move to a more intensional definition supporting the abstract view but more operational in the sense that it describes a means for determining such a set. We characterize the class of extensional strategies that can be defined intensionally. We also give some hints towards a logical characterization of intensional strategies and propose a few challenging perspectives.
Abstract. We propose a formal framework for the specification and validation of security policies. To model a secured system, the evolution of security information in the system is described by transitions triggered by authorization requests and the policy is given by a set of rules describing the way the corresponding decisions are taken. Policy rules are constrained rewrite rules whose constraints are first-order formulas on finite domains, which provides enhanced expressive power compared to classical security policy specification approaches like the ones using Datalog, for example. Our specifications have an operational semantics based on transition and rewriting systems and are thus executable. This framework also provides a common formalism to define, compare and compose security systems and policies. We define transformations over secured systems in order to perform validation of classical security properties.
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