This is a PDF file of a peer-reviewed paper that has been accepted for publication. Although unedited, the content has been subjected to preliminary formatting. Nature is providing this early version of the typeset paper as a service to our authors and readers. The text and figures will undergo copyediting and a proof review before the paper is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers apply.Attenuated replication and pathogenicity of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 Omicron

Summary Avian influenza A viruses rarely infect humans, but if they do and transmit among them, worldwide outbreaks (pandemics) can result. The recent sporadic infections of humans in China with a previously unrecognized avian influenza A virus of the H7N9 subtype (A(H7N9)) have caused concern due to the appreciable case fatality rate associated with these infections (>25%), potential instances of human-to-human transmission1, and the lack of pre-existing immunity among humans to viruses of this subtype. Here, we therefore characterized two early human A(H7N9) isolates, A/Anhui/1/2013 and A/Shanghai/1/2013 (H7N9; hereafter referred to as Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1, respectively). In mice, Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1 were more pathogenic than a control avian H7N9 virus (A/duck/Gunma/466/2011; H7N9; Dk/GM466) and a representative pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus (A/California/04/2009; H1N1; CA04). Anhui/1, Shanghai/1, and Dk/GM466 replicated well in the nasal turbinates of ferrets. In nonhuman primates (NHPs), Anhui/1 and Dk/GM466 replicated efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tracts, whereas the replicative ability of conventional human influenza viruses is typically restricted to the upper respiratory tract of infected primates. By contrast, Anhui/1 did not replicate well in miniature pigs upon intranasal inoculation. Most critically, Anhui/1 transmitted via respiratory droplets in one of three pairs of ferrets. Glycan arrays demonstrated that Anhui/1, Shanghai/1, and A/Hangzhou/1/2013 (a third human A(H7N9) virus tested in this assay) bind to human virus-type receptors, a property that may be critical for virus transmissibility in ferrets. Anhui/1 was less sensitive than a pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus to neuraminidase inhibitors, although both viruses were equally susceptible to an experimental antiviral polymerase inhibitor. The robust replicative ability in mice, ferrets, and NHPs and the limited transmissibility in ferrets of Anhui/1 suggest that A(H7N9) viruses have pandemic potential.

No abstract

No abstract

After the global spread of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron BA.2 lineage, some BA.2-related variants that acquire mutations in the L452 residue of spike protein, such as BA.2.9.1 and BA.2.13 (L452M), BA.2.12.1 (L452Q), and BA.2.11, BA.4 and BA.5 (L452R), emerged in multiple countries. Our statistical analysis showed that the effective reproduction numbers of these L452R/M/Q-bearing BA.2-related Omicron variants are greater than that of the original BA.2. Neutralization experiments revealed that the immunity induced by BA.1 and BA.2 infections is less effective against BA.4/5. Cell culture experiments showed that BA.2.12.1 and BA.4/5 replicate more efficiently in human alveolar epithelial cells than BA.2, and particularly, BA.4/5 is more fusogenic than BA.2. Furthermore, infection experiments using hamsters indicated that BA.4/5 is more pathogenic than BA.2. Altogether, our multiscale investigations suggest that the risk of L452R/M/Q-bearing BA.2-related Omicron variants, particularly BA.4 and BA.5, to global health is potentially greater than that of original BA.2.HighlightsSpike L452R/Q/M mutations increase the effective reproduction number of BA.2BA.4/5 is resistant to the immunity induced by BA.1 and BA.2 infectionsBA.2.12.1 and BA.4/5 more efficiently spread in human lung cells than BA.2BA.4/5 is more pathogenic than BA.2 in hamsters

Many enveloped viruses induce multinucleated cells (syncytia), reflective of membrane fusion events caused by the same machinery that underlies viral entry. These syncytia are thought to facilitate replication and evasion of the host immune response. Here, we report that co-culture of human cells expressing the receptor ACE2 with cells expressing SARS-CoV-2 spike, results in synapse-like intercellular contacts that initiate cell-cell fusion, producing syncytia resembling those we identify in lungs of COVID-19 patients. To assess the mechanism of spike/ACE2-driven membrane fusion, we developed a microscopy-based, cell-cell fusion assay to screen ~6000 drugs and >30 spike variants. Together with quantitative cell biology approaches, the screen reveals an essential role for biophysical aspects of the membrane, particularly cholesterol-rich regions, in spike-mediated fusion, which extends to replication-competent SARS-CoV-2 isolates. Our findings potentially provide a molecular basis for positive outcomes reported in COVID-19 patients taking statins and suggest new strategies for therapeutics targeting the membrane of SARS-CoV-2 and other fusogenic viruses.

In late 2022, the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron subvariants have highly diversified, and XBB is spreading rapidly around the world. Our phylogenetic analyses suggested that XBB emerged by recombination of two co-circulating BA.2 lineages, BJ.1 and BM.1.1.1 (a progeny of BA.2.75), during the summer of 2022 around India. In vitro experiments revealed that XBB is the most profoundly resistant variant to BA.2/5 breakthrough infection sera ever and is more fusogenic than BA.2.75. Notably, the recombination breakpoint is located in the receptor-binding domain of spike, and each region of recombined spike conferred immune evasion and augmented fusogenicity to the XBB spike. Finally, the intrinsic pathogenicity of XBB in hamsters is comparable to or even lower than that of BA.2.75. Our multiscale investigation provided evidence suggesting that XBB is the first documented SARS-CoV-2 variant increasing its fitness through recombination rather than single mutations.

In late 2022, SARS-CoV-2 Omicron subvariants have become highly diversified, and XBB is spreading rapidly around the world. Our phylogenetic analyses suggested that XBB emerged through the recombination of two cocirculating BA.2 lineages, BJ.1 and BM.1.1.1 (a progeny of BA.2.75), during the summer of 2022. XBB.1 is the variant most profoundly resistant to BA.2/5 breakthrough infection sera to date and is more fusogenic than BA.2.75. The recombination breakpoint is located in the receptor-binding domain of spike, and each region of the recombinant spike confers immune evasion and increases fusogenicity. We further provide the structural basis for the interaction between XBB.1 spike and human ACE2. Finally, the intrinsic pathogenicity of XBB.1 in male hamsters is comparable to or even lower than that of BA.2.75. Our multiscale investigation provides evidence suggesting that XBB is the first observed SARS-CoV-2 variant to increase its fitness through recombination rather than substitutions.