We discuss some research that has examined approach motivational urges and how this research clarifies the definition of approach motivation. Our research and that of others have raised doubts about the commonly accepted definition of approach motivation, which views it as a positive affective state triggered by positive stimuli. We review evidence that suggests: (a) that approach motivation is occasionally evoked by negative stimuli; (b) that approach motivation may be experienced as a negative state; and (c) that stimuli are unnecessary to evoke approach motivation.

Several studies have indicated that positive affective states cause a broadening of cognitive processes (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001), whereas negative affective states cause a narrowing of cognitive processes (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959;Finucane, 2011). That is, positive affect causes one's mind to be more open or more likely to see the forest, so to speak, whereas negative affect causes one's mind to be more narrowly focused or more likely to see the trees. This concept of broadening/narrowing of cognitive processes, or cognitive scope, has been assessed in a variety of ways, from perception to cognitive categorization. The idea that all negative states narrow and all positive states broaden is widely accepted (Fox, 2008), as it was supported by a preponderance of results before 2008. Below, we review a program of research conducted since 2008 that challenges this idea.We begin by defining constructs examined in this research. Affective states are psychophysiological constructs composed of underlying dimensions such as (a) valence, the positive-to-negative evaluation of the subjectively experienced state (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011); (b) motivational intensity, the strength of urge to move toward/away from a stimulus (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, in press); and (c) arousal, which can be measured subjectively and by activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and is a proxy for but not the same as motivational intensity Harmon-Jones et al., in press;Peterson & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Cognitive scope is similar to the breadth of cognitive expansiveness, and it can occur at perceptual, attentional, or conceptual levels. Cognitive scope has been assessed using measures of attentional and perceptual scope, categorization, unusualness of word association, social categorization, and memory details (see reviews by Fredrickson,

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We review a program of research that has suggested that affective states high in motivationally intensity (e.g., enthusiasm, disgust) narrow cognitive scope, whereas affective states low in motivationally intensity (e.g., joy, sadness) broaden cognitive scope. Further supporting this interpretation, indices of brain activations, derived from human electroencephalography, suggest that the motivational intensity of the affective state predicts the narrowing of cognitive scope. Finally, research suggests that the relationship between emotive intensity and cognitive scope is bi-directional, such that manipulated changes in cognitive scope influence early brain activations associated with emotive intensity. In the end, the review highlights how emotion can impair and improve certain cognitive processes.

Decades of research suggested that positive affective states broaden cognitive processes, whereas negative affective states narrow cognitive processes. More recent research suggests, however, that these conclusions may be premature. These past experiments often compared positive affects low in motivational intensity with negative affects high in motivational intensity. These past experiments, therefore, may have confounded affective valence with motivational intensity. Recent evidence suggests that motivational intensity rather than affective valence influences cognitive broadening ⁄ narrowing. That is, affective states of low motivational intensity (e.g., sadness, postgoal positive affect) broaden cognition, whereas affective states of high motivational intensity (e.g., disgust, pregoal positive affect) narrow cognition. We posit that narrowing occurs during affective states of high motivational intensity to aid organisms in acquiring desirable objects or avoiding aversive ones. In contrast, broadening occurs during affective states of low motivational intensity to open organisms to new opportunities.