The density hypothesis (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008) claims a general higher similarity of positive information to other positive information compared with the similarity of negative information to other negative information. This similarity asymmetry might explain valence asymmetries on all levels of cognitive processing. The available empirical evidence for this general valence asymmetry in similarity suffers from a lack of direct tests, low representativeness, and possible confounding variables (e.g., differential valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, or concreteness of positive and negative stimuli). To address these problems, Study 1 first validated the spatial arrangement method (SpAM) as a similarity measure. Using SpAM, Studies 2-6 found the proposed valence asymmetry in large, representative samples of self- and other-generated words (Studies 2a/2b), for words of consensual and idiosyncratic valence (Study 3), for words from 1 and many independent information sources (Study 4), for real-life experiences (Study 5), and for large data sets of verbal (i.e., ∼14,000 words reported by Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013) and visual information (i.e., ∼1,000 pictures reported in the IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005; Study 6). Together, these data support a general valence asymmetry in similarity, namely that good is more alike than bad. (PsycINFO Database Record

The density hypothesis states that positive information is more similar than negative information, resulting in higher density of positive information in mental representations. The present research applies the density hypothesis to recognition memory to explain apparent valence asymmetries in recognition memory, namely, a recognition advantage for negative information. Previous research explained this negativity advantage on the basis of valence-induced affect. We predicted that positive information's higher density impairs recognition performance. Two old-new word recognition experiments tested whether differential density between positive and negative stimuli creates a negativity advantage in recognition memory, over and above valence-induced affect. In Experiment 1, participants better discriminated negative word stimuli (i.e., less false alarms) and showed a response bias towards positive words. Regression analyses showed the asymmetry to be function of density and not of valence. Experiment 2 varied stimulus density orthogonal to valence. Again, discriminability and response bias were a function of density and not of valence. We conclude that the higher density of positive information causes an apparent valence asymmetry in recognition memory.

The economic conservation instrument of payments for ecosystem services (PES) enjoys an increasing popularity among scientists, politicians, and civil society organizations alike, while others raise concerns regarding the ecological effectiveness and social justice of this instrument. In this review article, we showcase the variety of existing PES definitions and systematically locate these definitions in the range between Coasean conceptualizations, which describe PES as conditional and voluntary private negotiations between ES providers and ES beneficiaries, and much broader Pigouvian PES understandings that also assign government-funded and involuntary schemes to the PES approach. It turns out that the scale at which PES operate, having so far received very little attention in the literature, as well as critique of PES must be considered in the context of the diversity of definitions to ensure the comparability between studies researching PES programs. Future research should better target linkages between global, regional, and local scales for the development of PES programs, while taking local collective governance systems for a sustainable use of resources into account more seriously.

The present research suggests that people adjust their mental response scales to an object's distance and construal level. People make use of wider response categories when they judge distant and abstract as compared with close and concrete stimuli. Across five experiments, participants worked on visual and verbal estimation problems (e.g., length or quantity judgments). Answers were provided in interval format, and differences between minimal and maximal estimates served as a measure of response category width. When target objects were framed as spatially distant rather than close (Studies 1 and 3), as unlikely rather than likely (Study 2), and as abstract rather than concrete (Study 4), category widths increased. Similarly, priming a high-level rather than a low-level mindset yielded wider interval estimates (Study 5). The general discussion highlights the usefulness of category width as a basic measure of construal level and as a theoretical link between various branches of construal-level theory.

No abstract