Dual-process theories of evaluative learning suggest that evaluative representations can be formed via two functionally distinct mechanisms: automatic formation of associative links between co-occurring events (associative learning) and nonautomatic generation and truth assessment of mental propositions about the relation between stimuli (propositional learning). Single-process propositional theories reject the idea of automatic association formation, attributing all instances of evaluative learning to propositional processes. A central question in the debate between the two theories concerns the mechanisms underlying unqualified effects of stimulus co-occurrence when the relation between the co-occurring stimuli suggests an evaluation that is opposite to the one implied by the observed co-occurrence (e.g., sunscreen prevents skin cancer). Addressing interpretational ambiguities in previous research on the differential impact of co-occurrence and relational information on implicit and explicit measures, the current research used a multinomial modeling approach to investigate the functional properties of the effects of co-occurrence and relational information on a single measure of evaluative responses. Although the moderating effects obtained for relational information are consistent with the predictions of the two theories, the obtained properties of co-occurrence effects pose an explanatory challenge to both dual-process and single-process propositional theories. The findings demonstrate the value of multinomial modeling in providing deeper insights into the functional properties of the effects of co-occurrence and relational information, which impose stronger empirical constraints on extant theories of evaluative learning.

In the field of evaluative conditioning (EC), two opposing theories—propositional single-process theory versus dual-process theory—are currently being discussed in the literature. The present set of experiments test a crucial prediction to adjudicate between these two theories: Dual-process theory postulates that evaluative conditioning can occur without awareness of the contingency between conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US); in contrast, single-process propositional theory postulates that EC requires CS-US contingency awareness. In a set of three studies, we experimentally manipulate contingency awareness by presenting the CSs very briefly, thereby rendering it unlikely to be processed consciously. We address potential issues with previous studies on EC with subliminal or near-threshold CSs that limited their interpretation. Across two experiments, we consistently found an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms and consistently failed to find an EC effect for briefly presented CSs. In a third pre-registered experiment, we again found evidence for an EC effect with CSs presented for 1000 ms, and we found some indication for an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132(5), 692-731. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692 ). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioural information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings (Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 17(11), 954-958. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x) This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, S., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2014). The role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(2), 187-209. doi: 10.1177/1088868314527832 ), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the most widely-studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance-task (Olson & Fazio, 2001) is a highly cited EC paradigm, and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for EC effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N =1478), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study. We obtained evidence for a small EC effect when ‘aware’ participants were excluded using the original criterion – therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence for the surveillance task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about ‘unaware’ EC effects.

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Several dual-process theories of evaluative learning posit two distinct implicit (or automatic) and explicit (or controlled) evaluative learning processes. As such, one may like a person explicitly but simultaneously dislike them implicitly. Dissociations between direct measures (e.g., Likert scales), reflecting explicit evaluations, and indirect measures (e.g., Implicit Association Test), reflecting implicit evaluations, support this claim. Rydell et al. (2006) found a striking dissociation when they brief flashed either positive or negative words prior to presenting a photograph of a person was with behavioral information of the opposite valence was presented: IAT scores reflected the valence of the flashed words whereas rating scores reflected the opposite valence of the behavioral information. A recent study, however, suggests that this finding may not be replicable. Given its theoretical importance, we report two new replication attempts (n = 153 recruited in Belgium, Germany and the USA; n = TBD recruited in Hong Kong and the USA).

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered ( N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when “aware” participants were excluded using the original criterion—therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about “unaware” evaluative-conditioning effects.

In two studies, we examined whether open science practices, such as making materials, data, and code of a study openly accessible, positively affect public trust in science. Furthermore, we investigated whether the potential trust-damaging effects of research being funded privately (e.g. by a commercial enterprise) may be buffered by such practices. After preregistering six hypotheses, we conducted a survey study (Study 1; N = 504) and an experimental study (Study 2; N = 588) in two German general population samples. In both studies, we found evidence for the positive effects of open science practices on trust, though it should be noted that in Study 2, results were more inconsistent. We did not however find evidence for the aforementioned buffering effect. We conclude that while open science practices may contribute to increasing trust in science, the importance of making use of open science practices visible should not be underestimated.