This paper addresses buyer market power in farm product procurement markets. We argue that buyer power concerns are often overstated because traditional models of buyer market power are incapable of depicting the economic interactions that are fundamental to modern agricultural markets, where exchange is governed by stable contractual relationships among buyers and farmers. The exercise of short-run oligopsony power is inimical to the long-run interests of buyers in these settings because below-competitive returns will lead to the exodus of resources from producing the product. Policy proposals grounded in the presumed linkage between concentration, competition, and market power may well be misguided and detrimental to the objectives proponents seek to advance.

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In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the presence of a large meatpacking (i.e., beef, pork, and broiler chicken) plant has affected county-level COVID-19 transmission dynamics. We find that—within 150 days after emergence of COVID-19 in a given county—the presence of a large beef packing facility increases per capita infection rates by 110%, relative to comparable counties without meatpacking plants. Large pork and chicken processing facilities increase transmission rates by 160% and 20%, respectively. While the presence of this type of industrial agricultural facility is shown to exacerbate initial disease transmission affecting large numbers of individuals in the community, over time daily case rates converge such that rates observed in meatpacking- and non-meatpacking counties become similar. In aggregate, results suggest that 334 thousand COVID-19 infections are attributable to meatpacking plants in the U.S. with associated mortality and morbidity costs totaling more than $11.2 billion.

The dimensions that define a food product have expanded rapidly to include characteristics of the production process, marketing arrangements, and implications that production and consumption of the product have for the environment. Some market intermediaries have responded by requiring that their suppliers abide by restrictive production practices. We examine the economic effects of such restrictions and apply this analysis to limitations on the use of antibiotics in U.S. pork production. Results from conceptual and simulation analyses show that, in the absence of demand growth, less pork is sold due to higher costs in the restricted segment, and both pork consumers (on average) and producers are harmed. Demand growth of between 6–11% from adding new consumers who will consume the restricted (antibiotic‐free) product but not the conventional product is needed to return consumer surplus to the level in the base case, and between 2–4% demand growth was required to return producer surplus to base. When restricted and conventional products are modeled using a vertical differentiation framework, results depend importantly on the ease with which consumers can switch to a seller who offers their desired product type. Significant distributional impacts among consumers are present when switching costs are prohibitive.

We analyze the impacts of minimum quality standards (MQS) imposed by producers acting collectively through a producer organization, such as a marketing order. MQS imposed in a competitive market can never enhance social welfare because in general an MQS creates two deadweight losses—one due to inefficient enhancement of product quality and a second due to wastage of the low‐quality product. Any MQS that a competitive industry implements based upon a profit criterion causes all consumers in the market to be harmed. However, an MQS may be preferred relative to supply control as a second‐best instrument for transferring income to producers.