Abstract:As the year 2000 American presidential election came to its conclusion, the Electoral College once again found itself under attack by critics, academics, and politicians. It was criticized as being archaic, flawed, and undemocratic. Calls for its abolition pointed to the principle of "one person, one vote" that had transformed contemporary political participation in the United States over the last century. However, calls for a system of presidential selection based on a pure form of popular democracy can lead to unintended and undemocratic outcomes. By examining the Electoral College in its constitutional as well as its political context this study finds that the Electoral College, rather than subverting democracy, preserves it in ways that are both enduring and significant. Those who suggest amending the Constitution need to confront the many negative consequences of jettisoning the present system of American presidential selection.
In writing the U.S. Constitution the framers anticipated that the use of American military force should require an extraordinary consensus between Congress and the President. The era of the Vietnam War led many to believe that Congress had become the junior partner to presidents who exercised an increasing degree of constitutional independence in use of force issues. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 attempted to address that constitutional imbalance. Our analysis of the constitutional debates surrounding the adoption of the WPR reveals that members of Congress were unable to agree upon a coherent "institutional" vision for Congress; even those who supported the measure were unsure of its meaning. When Congress took up measures related to the commitment of American forces in Kosovo, the same constitutional divisions that existed 25 years previously reemerged and Congress was unable to perform as a full constitutional partner-not because of presidential bullying, but because it lacked its own institutional view of its constitutional responsibilities.
Recent war powers debates have seen the emergence of two opposing viewpoints. Those who advocate close adherence to the Constitution and who assume congressional predominance in matters of war have squared off against those who point to modern political realities that require presidential independence and power. This article argues that the resulting interpretive dichotomy is both false and unnecessary. The Constitution created a vigorous executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, checked and balanced by an equally powerful Congress. This is borne out by analysis of the language of the Constitution, by an examination of its intent, and by judicial doctrine. An additional method of interpretation, structural argument, integrates text, intent, and doctrine and provides a theoretically sound and politically feasible framework for the exercise of the war power by the political branches. Presidential Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (September)
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