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The serine threonine kinase Akt1 has been implicated in the control of cellular metabolism, survival and growth. Herein, disruption of the ubiquitously expressed member of the Akt family of genes, Akt1, in the mouse, demonstrates a requirement for Akt1 in miRNA-mediated cellular apoptosis. The miR-17/20 cluster is known to inhibit breast cancer cellular proliferation through G1/S cell cycle arrest via binding to the cyclin D1 3'UTR. Here we show that miR-17/20 overexpression sensitizes cells to apoptosis induced by either Doxorubicin or UV irradiation in MCF-7 cells via Akt1. miR-17/20 mediates apoptosis via increased p53 expression which promotes Akt degradation. Akt1 −/− mammary epithelial cells which express Akt2 and Akt3 demonstrated increased apoptosis to DNA damaging agents. Akt1 deficiency abolished the miR-17/20-mediated apoptosis. These results demonstrated a novel pathway through which miR17/20 regulate p53 and Akt controlling breast cancer cell apoptosis.

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This paper proposes a browser spoofing attack which can break the weakest link from the server to user, i.e., man-computerinterface, and hence defeat the whole security system of Internet transaction. In this attack, when a client is misled to an attacker's site, or an attacker hijacks a connection, a set of malicious HTML files are downloaded to the client's machine. The files are used to create a spoofed browser including a faked window with malicious event processing methods. The bogus window, having the same appearance as the original one, shows the "good" web content with "bad" activities behind such as disclosing password stealthily. Once the attack is mounted, even a scrupulous user will trust the browser that is fully controlled by the attacker. We further propose several countermeasures against the attack.

In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of a family of ultra-lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocols: LMAP, M2AP and EMAP, which are recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. We identify two effective attacks, namely de-synchronization attack and full-disclosure attack, against their protocols. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. It can be carried out in just single round of interaction in the authentication protocols. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. It is accomplished across several runs of the protocols. Moreover, we point out the potential countermeasures to improve the security of above protocols.