A substantial literature links passive bureaucratic gender representation to better outcomes for represented citizens. However, because existing studies have been carried out primarily at the organizational level, it is not known whether these effects are caused by individual‐level interaction or by organizational processes. This article investigates whether gender matching in individual relationships affects citizen outcomes. The context of the study is a program in which young job seekers without vocational training were assigned to a job counselor for one‐on‐one meetings. The article finds that gender matching has a positive effect on citizen outcomes and that this effect is partly explained by an increased level of effort on the part of the citizen. This implies that citizen outcomes can be improved by matching bureaucrats and citizens of the same gender or by providing training to bureaucrats to enable them to better serve citizens of the opposite gender.

Despite laws of universalistic treatment, bureaucrats have been shown to discriminate against minorities. A crucial question for public administration is how bureaucracies can be organized in ways that minimize illegitimate discrimination. Especially, since theories suggest that prejudices happen unintentionally and particularly under high workload, bureaucrats' working conditions may be important. Four randomized experiments support the notion that bureaucrats discriminate as a way of coping with high workload. Most notably, a field experiment randomly assigned teachers to reduced workloads by giving them resources to have more time with the same group of students. In a subsequent survey experiment-using a fictitious future scenario unrelated to the resources provided in the field experiment-discrimination was minimized in the field treatment group, but persisted in the control group. The results thereby support the notion that even though discrimination among bureaucrats does not (only) occur in a reflective manner it can be reduced by altering the way bureaucrats' work is organized.

Frontline employees cope with high workloads and limited resources by directing their work attention and efforts toward particular clients. Yet, the role of client attributes in frontline employees’ efforts to help clients remains undertheorized and empirically understudied. Using a survey experimental vignette design (2 × 2 factorial) among 1,595 Danish caseworkers, the authors of this article provide new knowledge on how two generic nondemographic client attributes—competence and motivation—shape frontline employees’ willingness to help their clients. We found that both the competence and motivation of clients affect caseworkers’ willingness to exert extra time and effort helping clients. Specifically, caseworkers are most willing to help a client appearing both competent and motivated. Moreover, our data suggests that client motivation is more important than client competence for caseworkers’ willingness to help. We end the article with a discussion of policy implications and directions for future research.

Equal treatment is a key feature of modern bureaucracy. However, several studies have shown that public organizations discriminate against ethnic and racial minorities to different degrees. Which organizational features explain differences in discrimination is largely unknown. This article proposes that organizational performance relates to an organization's likelihood of engaging in employment discrimination and argues that poor‐performing organizations tend to be less open to new ideas and that decision makers in such organizations are more prone to stereotyping behavior. The study combines a field experiment in which applications were sent to real job vacancies in 71 Danish public schools with administrative data on the schools. Bayesian analyses show that minority applicants generally faced discrimination but that they experienced a higher callback rate from better‐performing schools than from poorer‐performing schools. Implications for practice and research are discussed.

During a global pandemic, individual views of government can be linked to citizens' trust and cooperation with government and their propensity to resist state policies or to take action that influences the course of a pandemic. This article explores citizens' assessments of government responses to COVID‐19 as a function of policy substance (restrictions on civil liberties), information about performance, and socioeconomic inequity in outcomes. We conducted a survey experiment and analyzed data on over 7000 respondents from eight democratic countries. We find that across countries, citizens are less favorable toward COVID‐19 policies that are more restrictive of civil liberties. Additionally, citizens' views of government performance are significantly influenced by objective performance information from reputable sources and information on the disproportionate impacts of COVID‐19 on low‐income groups. This study reinforces the importance of policy design and outcomes and the consideration of multiple public values in the implementation of public policies.

Quasi-markets that introduce choice and competition between public service providers are intended to improve quality and efficiency. This paper demonstrates that quasi-market competition may also affect the distribution of users. First, we develop a simple theoretical framework that distinguishes between user sorting and cream-skimming as mechanisms through which quasi-markets may lead to high-ability users becoming more concentrated among one group of providers and low-ability users among a different group. Second, we empirically examine the impact of a nationwide quasi-market policy that introduced choice and activity-based budgeting into Danish public high schools. We exploit variation in the degree of competition that schools were exposed to, based on the concentration of providers within a geographical area. Using a differences-in-differences design—and register data containing the full population of students over a nine-year period (N=207,394)—we show that the composition of students became more concentrated in terms of intake grade point average after the reform in high-competition areas relative to low-competition areas. These responses in high-competition regions appear to be driven both by changes in user sorting on the demand side and by cream-skimming behavior among public providers on the supply side.

We argue that poor performing organizations are more likely to discriminate against ethnic minority job applicants. We conduct a field experiment in 72 Danish public schools. We merge these data with administrative data. Results show that minority applicants experience a higher callback rate from better performing schools.

Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.