Highlights The links between transparency and sustainabilityare poorly understood. We present a typology of information for supply chain governance. The coverage of existing transparencyinitiatives is limited and biased in scope. We present ten ways in which transparency can improve sustainability governance.

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We present results of the field assessment using a total of fifteen 0.1 ha mangrove permanent sample plots (PSPs) in four selected countries in Central Africa, including: Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Democratic of Republic, which together account for 90 % of mangroves in Central Africa. Above-and belowground carbon stocks were computed using data from the PSPs in all four countries. Long-term monitoring data in Cameroon were used to estimate carbon sequestration rates. Four major carbon pools were considered: aboveground carbon, belowground root carbon, deadwood and the soil organic carbon. All the eight mangrove species described in Central Africa were encountered in the study. The dominant species in Central Africa is Rhizophora racemosa, and it occupies more than 70 % of the forest formation. The average stand density ranged from a low of 450 tree/ha in degraded forest of RoC to a high of 3,256 tree/ha in undisturbed stands of Cameroon. Standing volume ranged from a low of 213 m 3 /ha in RoC to a high of 428 m 3 /ha in Cameroon; corresponding to aboveground biomass values of 251 and 505 Mg/ha, respectively. Together with the deadwoods, the total vegetation biomass in the study area ranged from a low of 394 Mg/ha in RoC to a high of 825 Mg/ha in Cameroon. Mean diameter increment for primary and secondary stems was 0.15 cm/year. This translates to above-and belowground annual biomass increments of 12.7 and 3.1 Mg/ha/year, respectively. Total ecosystem carbon in undisturbed system was estimated at 1520 ± 164 Mg/ha with 982 Mg/ ha (or 65 %) in belowground component (soils and roots) and 538 Mg/ha (35 %) in the aboveground components. Carbon density differed significantly (p \ 0.05) with forest

The concept of payments for environmental services (PES) lends itself to an extremely diverse array of experimentations. At a time when PES are likely to be scaled up massively in certain parts of the tropics, notably in the context of REDD+, it is important to refine the scope of implementation of the instrument to avoid several perverse effects specific to PES and sustain its benefits over time. We analyze recent developments in PES based on a review of literature and emerging practices as we observe them in the field. Using various elements from the theory of economics, public action and environmental management, we flag five key aspects of PES that are often overlooked in most influential studies on PES:(1) the nature of the environmental service providers, (2) the actual efficiency gains of involving industrial and commercial actors, (3) the type of contractual obligations incumbent to the providers and duration of payments, (4) the potential macroeconomic effects of an upscaling of PES, and (5) the risk that PES undermine the consolidation of fragile states. If these elements are not properly addressed in the design of PES, this paper explains that the instrument risks delivering only ephemeral environmental results, while inducing a dangerous shift towards the 'polluter-profits' principle. Conversely, we explain how systematically going beyond monetary payments and integrating elements of technical support to encourage alternative productive activities is key to sustain PES benefits over time.

Alain Karsenty et al., « Paiements pour services environnementaux et biodiversité dans les pays du sud. Le salut par la « déforestation évitée » »,

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