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We use a stated preference instrument to elicit producer preferences for the attributes of risk-shifting hog marketing contracts and express acceptable producer trade-offs between contract attributes in a convenient dollar metric. Respondents value an increase in a window contract's price ceiling three to five times more than the same increase in the price floor, which suggests that hog producers dislike contracts that limit up-side price potential (limit positive skewness). The contractor's organizational form is also important. Cooperative forms are preferred by many respondents, particularly those who state that trust in the contractor is an important antecedent for any contractual relationship. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Dynamics in the global food system, coupled with rapid advance in agricultural biotechnology, have resulted in additional demands for capturing information and sharing information vertically within the supply chain. Food safety and quality characteristics are a cornerstone of this information demand. Events such as foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), genetic engineering and animal welfare concerns have laid the foundation for additional information need. Managers of private firms within the food supply chain must decide how to respond to the situation. A crucial component of the problem is what and how to provide information to downstream customers as well as stipulate what and how information is received from upstream suppliers. Alternative signaling mechanisms abound. The choice among these alternative signals, or combination of alternatives, has both short‐ and long‐run implications for the reputation of the firm, its products or services, and the efficiency with which it conducts its business. The signaling problem in the supply chain is bidirectional and has three critical dimensions: information asymmetry, incentive asymmetry, and arduous measurability. From a broad perspective, the choice set for signaling includes: strategies that rely on third‐party protocols and procedures; differentiation through branding and reputation; indemnification strategies such as insurance, warranties, and bonding; and coordination strategies such as strategic alliances and vertical integration (intemalization). Each mechanism for signaling differentially influences the three dimensions of the signaling problem. No globally optimal strategy solution exists. Differentiation through branding and reputation mitigate the signaling problem relatively well compared with the other alternatives.

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The dynamics of the food system are rapidly evolving so that intangible assets are relatively more important than tangible assets. This evolving shift in the basis of rivalry among firms puts increasing demands on corporate strategy. A future challenge for agrifood firms is to embrace strategy that includes, at least conceptually, knowledge as a strategic asset of a firm. Knowledge and its management are emerging in contemporary thought as a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage. This analysis begins by examining the next evolutionary phase in supply chain integration as a learning supply chain. Conceptually a learning supply chain offers the significant benefits of a truly agile, dynamic response capability for end-users and a fair distribution of returns to all chain participants. The focus then turns to the relationships between network embeddedness and the strategic mix between exploitation and exploration, using knowledge management logic. Managing knowledge for agrifood firms implies the creation and commercialization of intangible assets. The analysis indicates that significant intangibles in the form of brand equity may influence supply chain characteristics to strong ties and close networks. Some specific characteristics would be relatively high embeddedness, high social capital, more easily exchanged tacit knowledge, and higher levels of trust.