Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a Non-technical summaryThe socio-economical composition of a company's executive board is highly relevant for economic and social policy. For example, gender quotas are often advocated to improve career outcomes for females and 'break the glass ceiling'. Similarly, educational requirements for bank boards have been proposed in the past as a means to improve corporate governance.However, little is known about the effects on firm outcomes of having more female, more educated or older board members. Do female board members really force a less risky conduct of business? Do educated board members increase or reduce bank risk-taking? And does the age of executive board members matter?We construct a unique dataset for the entire population of German bank executive teams for the period 1994 -2010. Exploiting this dataset, we examine how the age, gender, and education composition of banks' executive boards affect bank risk taking. In our first test, we empirically establish that age, gender, and education affect the observed volatility of bank profits. In a second step, we compare banks which experienced changes in board structure to similar banks without such a change. Generally, changes in board structure could be symptoms of underlying trends in a bank's business model. For example, shareholders might appoint directors with similar views regarding the bank's optimal strategy. Such underlying trends would confound our analysis, as we would attribute the changes in risk taking to the new board structure. We circumvent this problem by only considering board changes due to the retirement of a board member. This strategy allows us to capture the impact of a younger, more female or more experienced board.We obtain the following key results. First, we show that younger executive teams increase risk-taking. Second, board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives also lead to a more risky conduct of business. Third, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines. This has important policy implications: while quotas regarding the age, gender and education of an executive directly affect the representation of different groups on executive boards, they have a knock-on effect on corporate outcomes.
Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a Non-technical summaryThe socio-economical composition of a company's executive board is highly relevant for economic and social policy. For example, gender quotas are often advocated to improve career outcomes for females and 'break the glass ceiling'. Similarly, educational requirements for bank boards have been proposed in the past as a means to improve corporate governance.However, little is known about the effects on firm outcomes of having more female, more educated or older board members. Do female board members really force a less risky conduct of business? Do educated board members increase or reduce bank risk-taking? And does the age of executive board members matter?We construct a unique dataset for the entire population of German bank executive teams for the period 1994 -2010. Exploiting this dataset, we examine how the age, gender, and education composition of banks' executive boards affect bank risk taking. In our first test, we empirically establish that age, gender, and education affect the observed volatility of bank profits. In a second step, we compare banks which experienced changes in board structure to similar banks without such a change. Generally, changes in board structure could be symptoms of underlying trends in a bank's business model. For example, shareholders might appoint directors with similar views regarding the bank's optimal strategy. Such underlying trends would confound our analysis, as we would attribute the changes in risk taking to the new board structure. We circumvent this problem by only considering board changes due to the retirement of a board member. This strategy allows us to capture the impact of a younger, more female or more experienced board.We obtain the following key results. First, we show that younger executive teams increase risk-taking. Second, board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives also lead to a more risky conduct of business. Third, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines. This has important policy implications: while quotas regarding the age, gender and education of an executive directly affect the representation of different groups on executive boards, they have a knock-on effect on corporate outcomes.
We study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support (bailouts) on banks' liquidity creation. We rely on instrumental variables to deal with possible endogeneity concerns. Our key findings, which are based on a unique supervisory German dataset, are that regulatory interventions robustly trigger decreases in liquidity creation, while capital support does not affect liquidity creation. Additional results include the effects of these actions on different components of liquidity creation, lending, and risk taking. Our findings provide new and important insights into the debates about the design of regulatory interventions and bailouts.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.