We revisit the old but still vibrant Post-Keynesian debate over 'fully-adjusted positions', defined by the long-run equality of actual and standard utilisation rates. The central proposition of this paper is that in a world where different groups inside and outside firms have different objectives, the equality of actual and standard utilisation should not be treated as the only possible long-run equilibrium condition. The argument is illustrated in a model of target return pricing with conflict inflation, building on the work of Marc Lavoie. A 'common language' for the conflicting claims by shareholders, managers and workers is developed in terms of target profit rates, and it is shown that these contradictory claims can be partly reconciled through variations in the utilisation rate. The analysis unifies history and equilibrium in the sense that the nature of final equilibrium position and the adjustment to it depend on the objectives of the dominant social groups. We distinguish a 'Fordist regime' and a 'financialisation regime' and produce simulation results within a simple stock-flow consistent model that are broadly consistent with the stylised facts of these distinct historical phases of capitalism.

Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders’ interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability. JEL classification: D21, E12, G30

International audienceThis article analyses the Keynesian multiplier from a new perspective. Recent empirical studies emphasize that the multiplier is endogenous to the level of economic activity, increasing during recessions and declining in expansions. Here, we propose a plausible explanation for this established fact based on the procyclicality of capitalists' propensity to save. Then, using a standard Kaleckian model of growth and distribution, we perform some simple simulations showing that fiscal multipliers increase during turbulent times. Consequently, this argues against cutting public spending for economies in recession