Public goods provided by different land management practices in European regions have increasingly attained attention in agricultural policy debates. By focusing on the social-ecological systems (SES) framework, the systemic interrelations (e.g. drivers, resources, actors, governance regimes and policy impact) in land management across several case studies in various topographical and climatic conditions across ten European Union Member States are provided. The analysis of agricultural and forestry systems reveals a wide range of factors that drive the provision of 'ecologically and socially beneficial outcomes' (ESBOs). The respective influencing aspects cannot be reduced to market forces and policy support, but have to address simultaneously the pivotal role of social, cultural and institutional drivers as well. In particular, the tight interplay between public policies and private initiatives, and market mechanisms and societal appreciation of public goods delivery have shown to be the indispensable clue for understanding the relationship shaping the level of provision of public goods. Comparative analyses support the strong reliance on context, history, types of regions and differentiation of management systems which might be used for recommendations in the current debate on the future Common Agricultural Policy.

In an attempt to capture a greater share of the symbolic value of coffee in the market, some producers have started to safeguard the geographical names of specific origins through Geographical Indications in their home country, and then subsequently registering Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) under European Union (EU) law. To enable effective value capture, such initiatives require successful collective action. We explain how the need for collective action has manifested within four coffee Protected Geographical Indications in Colombia, Indonesia and Thailand (2 cases). Based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, we examine the cases following a common analytical approach, encompassing: i) contextual setting of product and territory; ii) actors involved; iii) institutional arrangements and action arena; and iv) the outcome of these arrangements. The cases involved a diversity of applicants including a producer association (Colombia), a social foundation and a private company (Thailand), and a government-supported consortium (Indonesia). The process of institutionalizing the GI required powerful, and well-resourced actors to assume a lead role resulting in relatively little participation from actual producers themselves. Therefore, this does not truly satisfy the IAD requirements for effective collective action, such compliance with the EU requirement for collective action was mainly observed as an administrative formality. The design of guiding rules for collective action processes are seen to significantly affect their effectiveness and the distribution of any benefits generated. This article emphasizes how this design is shaped by the positionality and particular interests of the actors involved, their different capacity to exert power and influence, their diverse attitudes towards moral legitimacy, and varying relationships with external actors such as development agents, research organizations and state agencies.

No abstract