SummaryBackgroundThe WHO declared the 2014 west African Ebola epidemic a public health emergency of international concern in view of its potential for further international spread. Decision makers worldwide are in need of empirical data to inform and implement emergency response measures. Our aim was to assess the potential for Ebola virus to spread across international borders via commercial air travel and assess the relative efficiency of exit versus entry screening of travellers at commercial airports.MethodsWe analysed International Air Transport Association data for worldwide flight schedules between Sept 1, 2014, and Dec 31, 2014, and historic traveller flight itinerary data from 2013 to describe expected global population movements via commercial air travel out of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Coupled with Ebola virus surveillance data, we modelled the expected number of internationally exported Ebola virus infections, the potential effect of air travel restrictions, and the efficiency of airport-based traveller screening at international ports of entry and exit. We deemed individuals initiating travel from any domestic or international airport within these three countries to have possible exposure to Ebola virus. We deemed all other travellers to have no significant risk of exposure to Ebola virus.FindingsBased on epidemic conditions and international flight restrictions to and from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as of Sept 1, 2014 (reductions in passenger seats by 51% for Liberia, 66% for Guinea, and 85% for Sierra Leone), our model projects 2·8 travellers infected with Ebola virus departing the above three countries via commercial flights, on average, every month. 91 547 (64%) of all air travellers departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had expected destinations in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Screening international travellers departing three airports would enable health assessments of all travellers at highest risk of exposure to Ebola virus infection.InterpretationDecision makers must carefully balance the potential harms from travel restrictions imposed on countries that have Ebola virus activity against any potential reductions in risk from Ebola virus importations. Exit screening of travellers at airports in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone would be the most efficient frontier at which to assess the health status of travellers at risk of Ebola virus exposure, however, this intervention might require international support to implement effectively.FundingCanadian Institutes of Health Research.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerged from China as an untreatable and rapidly spreading respiratory illness of unknown etiology. Following point source exposure in February 2003, more than a dozen guests infected at a Hong Kong hotel seeded multi-country outbreaks that persisted through the spring of 2003. The World Health Organization responded by invoking traditional public health measures and advanced technologies to control the illness and contain the cause. A novel coronavirus was implicated and its entire genome was sequenced by mid-April 2003. The urgency of responding to this threat focused scientific endeavor and stimulated global collaboration. Through real-time application of accumulating knowledge, the world proved capable of arresting the first pandemic threat of the twenty-first century, despite early respiratory-borne spread and global susceptibility. This review synthesizes lessons learned from this remarkable achievement. These lessons can be applied to re-emergence of SARS or to the next pandemic threat to arise.

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Screening at national borders may not be effective in controlling SARS spread.

The number of deaths attributable to influenza is believed to be considerably higher than the number certified by vital statistics registration as due to influenza. Weekly mortality data for Canada from the 1989/1990 to the 1998/1999 influenza seasons were analysed by cause of death, age group, and place of death to estimate the impact of influenza on mortality. A Poisson regression model was found to accurately predict all-cause, as well as cause-specific mortality, as a function of influenza-certified deaths, after controlling for seasonality, and trend. Influenza-attributable deaths were calculated as predicted less baseline-predicted deaths. In summary, throughout the 1990s there were on average just under 4000 deaths attributable to influenza annually (for an influenza-attributable mortality rate of 13/100,000 persons), varying from no detectable excess mortality for the 1990/1991 influenza season, to 6000-8000 influenza-attributable deaths for the more severe influenza seasons of 1997/1998 and 1998/1999. On average, 8% (95% CI 7-10) of influenza-attributable deaths were certified as influenza, although this percentage varied from 4% to 12% from year to year. Only 15% of the influenza-attributable deaths were certified as pneumonia, and for all respiratory causes, 40%. Deaths were distributed over most causes. The weekly pattern of influenza-certified deaths was a good predictor of excess all-cause mortality.