Background Corruption affects businesses in various ways. Anti-corruption, on the other hand, can improve the institutions of the country as well as business operations. Vietnam, as a socialist-oriented country with an ongoing high-profile anti-corruption campaign, provides us a unique setting to evaluate the impacts of anti-corruption on corporate performance. Objectives We address two questions: (1) what is the effect of anti-corruption on the performance of private-owned firms in Vietnam? and (2) how does anti-corruption influence the performance of firms with state ownership (FSOs) in Vietnam? Research design To investigate the impact of anti-corruption on performance of firms with different ownership settings, we use the establishment of the Central Anti-Corruption Steering Committee of Vietnam as a quasi-natural experiment for difference-in-differences analysis. We generate treatment effects of private holding and the state block ownership. To validate the findings, we construct a novel news-based anti-corruption index from Vietnamese online newspapers and use it in a robustness test to evaluate anti-corruption’s impacts on firm performance. Results and Conclusions We find a positive impact of the anti-corruption campaign on private firms’ performance, supporting the social norm perspective of how corruption affects businesses. The empirical results indicate a negative impact of the campaign on FSOs’ performance. The findings suggest that anti-corruption benefits private firms via improving the institutional quality of the country while improving the financial transparency of FSOs. Our study provides a method for measuring anti-corruption which is virtually unobservable and absent in the literature. The findings have implications for policymaking in contemporary Vietnam.

This paper investigates the impacts of four distinct types of political connection on financial reporting quality (FRQ) using a unique sample of Malaysian listed firms during 2002–2016. Using a battery of regression techniques, we show that political connections associate with lower FRQ only in firms connected to the government through government‐linked investments and politically connected directors. However, the impact is absent in firms connected via personal relationships such as family members of the leading politicians and crony capitalists. We suggest that corporate FRQ varies across different categories of political connection and support the resource dependence theory.

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