This paper focuses on key areas for reducing transport costs in Southern Africa emerging from recent research on cross-border freight between Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We consider the impact of competition, border delays and lack of return loads on transport rates which could be reduced significantly through increased availability of return loads for transporters, linked to growing industrial capacity in each country. Furthermore, increased competition and reducing delays for transporters contributed to a large reduction in transport rates between Lusaka and Johannesburg, with similar effects from Malawi. Margins charged in refrigerated transport are high due to low levels of rivalry and lack of return loads. Measures to reduce border constraints and enable greater rivalry between transporters from different countries could have a downward effect on transport rates in the region which are shown to be above benchmarks for efficient transport.

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Power asymmetries in the governance of value chains mean that inequalities in access to resources and share of value added are skewed against smaller players. Policies enforcing market rules and ensuring fairness are ineffective when power is deeply entrenched, necessitating different rules to address such inequalities. South Africa's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies and competition laws target economic redress and inclusion of historically disadvantaged people in business ownership and control of economic activities. BEE criteria have been embedded in many industry charters and implementation codes, and competition law is well established and effectively implemented. Yet, the impacts of these instruments have been limited and slow, especially in sectors where a few companies dominate. This article examines the interactions between value chain dynamics and industrial fishery quota allocations, BEE policy and competition dynamics in the hake deep-sea trawl fishery sector. It shows that, even in one of the most regulated sectors of South Africa's economy, large incumbents retain a disproportionate amount of power vis-à-vis smaller players. The article concludes that if rules protect incumbency, inequality will be sustained. Quota allocations, transformation and competition regulation should go hand in hand to facilitate the effective participation of black-owned businesses as competitors in value chains.The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and instructive comments.

Anti-competitive conduct involves firms misrepresenting their behaviour and manipulating markets. In sector case studies of cement and fertiliser, the authors find that collusion in southern and East Africa operated through industry associations exchanging information, secret agreements and lobbying government to distort notionally developmental policies for private benefit. This has occurred in the context of liberalisation and deregulation. Transnational corporations have leveraged control of infrastructure and inputs, and favourable regulations to sustain market power, while presenting themselves as ‘development partners’. Competition law is portrayed as the ‘governance fix’ for these issues but this ignores political economy issues which underpin many collusive arrangements.

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